SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Bavorova, Miroslava; Curtiss, Jarmila.

The study investigates determinants of affiliation with the two strongest associations in Czech agriculture. These represent Agricultural Association grouping large-scale enterprises and Association of Private Farmers, respectively. Our objective is to analyze whether associations with different types of members (large-scale enterprises vs. private farmers) experience different motives for joining or lapsing. Moreover, we investigate if there are characteristics of the associations' members which positively correlate to membership. The results imply that political lobbying is the main entry incentive for both large-scale enterprises and individual farmers. Informal information exchange is a more significant motivation for private farmers than for...

Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes

Palavras-chave: Associations; Agricultural enterprises; Czech agriculture; Selective incentives; Individual farms; Transition; Farm Management; D71; D72; D73; L14; L21; L22; C35.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25770

Chong, Alberto E.; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; Wantchekon, Leonard.

Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identifcation with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are...

Tipo: Working Paper

Palavras-chave: Corruption; Accountability; Elections; Voting; Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy; Public Economics; D72; D73; D82; D83.

Ano: 2012

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121640

Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment

Merlo, Antonio.

In this paper we structurally estimate a game-theoretic model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy. We focus on the timing and the terms of government agreements in the context of a multilateral stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information (Merlo and Wilson (1194, 1995)) where efficient delays may occur in the unique equilibrium. Besides showing that our model yields a good fit to the data on the duration of negotiations over government formation as well as government durations in postwar Italy, we use our estimates to quantify the advantage to proposing and to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. We show that the gains from proposing tend to be quite...

Environmentalists' Behaviour and Environmental Policies

Palavras-chave: Noncooperative bargaining; Delay; Government formation; Structural estimation; Duration models.; Political Economy; C41; C51; C73; C78; D72.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7476

Canton, Joan.

In this partial equilibrium and static model, the impact of environmentalism on two countries' environmental policies is presented. First, the only (indirect) way environmentalists influence the choice of pollution taxes is through a negative term in the welfare function in Home. It is defined as passive environmentalism (PE). Second, this article is a first attempt to consider domestic environmentalists lobbying a foreign government. It is defined as active environmentalism (AE). Our contribution is threefold. We emphasize first that the way environmentalists act is paramount to study the consequences of their actions. Passive or active environmentalisms have very different impacts on environmental policies. Second, we show that lobbying activities can be...

Economia política da disputa por terras em Minas Gerais

Palavras-chave: Environmentalism; Lobby Groups; Positive Environmental Economics; Strategic Environmental Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; D72.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54303

Araujo Junior, Ari Francisco de; Shikida, Claudio; Alvarenga, Patricia Silva.

The article analyzes the determinants of the probability of dispute over land (conflicts, occupations and settlement projects) in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. Through the use of a logit model, we found that the main influences are political and economical ones. Apparently, the behavior of the agrarian reform’s supporters follows the political incentive, with fewer occurrences of conflicts in towns governed by political allies. By other hand, the economical determinants - degree of poverty and the economic growth - have negative impacts on it.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Agrarian development; Political economy; Regional economics; Agribusiness; D72; D74; O43.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61236

Evolution of Rural Financial Market in China: An Institutional "Lock in" or Gradualism?

Jia, Xiangping; Guo, Pei.

Historically, China's political attempts to provide access to rural credit has met with mixed results and an institutional structure that often strays from intended policy goals. There has been a close correspondence between financial depression and many policy-driven financial institutions that dominated the rural financial system in China. More recently, ongoing reforms are dedicated towards a gradual liberalization within the system. In this study, we explore the context of agricultural transition and political process as defined by the various interlinkages across the Chinese rural financial system. We find that there has been negligible progress in the evolution of the rural financial market in China. The policy-led financial institutions ended up as...

Government turnover in parliamentary democracies

Palavras-chave: Rural finance; Institutions; Intervention; Gradualism; China; Financial Economics; E44; N25; D72; Q14.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7944

Diermeier, Daniel; Merlo, Antonio.

In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) surplus governments; (5) Minority governments; (6) The relative instability of minority governments.

Mass Media and Public Policy: Global Evidence from Agricultural Policies

Palavras-chave: Government stability; Minority coalitions; Surplus coalitions.; Political Economy; D72; H19; C73.

Ano: 1998

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7453

Olper, Alessandro; Swinnen, Johan F.M..

Mass media plays a crucial role in information distribution and thus in the political market and public policy making. Theory predicts that information provided by mass media reflects the media’s incentives to provide news to different types of groups in society, and affects these groups’ influence in policy-making. We use data on agricultural policy from 67 countries, spanning a wide range of development stages and media markets, to test these predictions. We find that, in line with theoretical hypotheses, public support to agriculture is strongly affected by the mass media. In particular, an increase in the share of informed voters, and a greater role of the private televisions in society is associated with policies which benefit the majority more: it...

Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes

Palavras-chave: Mass Media; Media Structure; Information; Agricultural Protection; Political Economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Development; Political Economy; Public Economics; D72; D83; Q18.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51694

Olper, Alessandro; Raimondi, Valentina.

This paper deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a panel of observations for more than 70 developing and developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the comparative politics literature that see political institutions as key elements in shaping public policies. Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a positive effect of a transition into democracy on agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks substantial heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) democracies, as well as to permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracies. Moreover, while...

Rational Exaggeration in Information Aggregation Games

Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Comparative Political Economics; Agricultural Distortions; Constitutional Rules; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; D72; H23; O13; P16.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50304

Rausser, Gordon C.; Simon, Leo K.; Zhao, Jinhua.

This paper studies a class of information aggregation models which we call “aggregation games.” It departs from the related literature in two main respects: information is aggregated by averaging rather than majority rule, and each player selects from a continuum of reports rather than making a binary choice. Each member of a group receives a private signal, then submits a report to the center, who makes a decision based on the average of these reports. The essence of an aggregation game is that heterogeneous players engage in a “tug-of-war,” as they attempt to manipulate the center’s decision process by mis-reporting their private information. When players have distinct biases, almost of them rationally exaggerate the extent of these biases. The degree of...

Can Process Conditionality Enhance Aid Effectiveness? The Role of Bureaucratic Interest and Public Pressure

Palavras-chave: Information aggregation; Majority rule; Proportional representation; Mean versus median mechanism; Strategic communication; Incomplete information games; Strategic information transmission; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; F71; D72; D82.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43976

Hefeker, Carsten; Michaelowa, Katharina.

Can process conditionality really enhance poverty reduction in developing countries? This question is addressed in the framework of a politico-economic model considering political distortions both on the recipient and on the donor side. It turns out that process conditionality is a very useful tool to raise the welfare of the poor as long as the international aid organizations hold all necessary information to assess the political situation in recipient countries and to select the true representatives of the poor into a participatory process. If they do not hold this information or if other bureaucratic interests reduce their incentive to acquire this information, process conditionality loses its effectiveness in achieving the desired objective.

Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases

Palavras-chave: Poverty reduction; Process conditionality; Political economy of international organizations.; Food Security and Poverty; Political Economy; D72; D73; F35; O19.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26389

Alberini, Anna; Austin, David H..

Proponents of environmental policies based on liability assert that strict liability imposed on polluters induces firms to handle hazardous wastes properly. We run regressions relating unintended pollution releases to strict liability imposed on polluters, exploiting variation across states and over time in the liability provisions of state mini-Superfund laws. Strict liability reduces the frequency and severity of pollution releases, provided it is modeled endogenously with the latter. Its effects vary with firm size. Partially sheltered from liability, small firms may have specialized in riskier production processes, but their number has not necessarily grown in response to the states' liability policy.

Uncertainty, Wage Setting and Decision Making in a Monetary Union

Palavras-chave: Strict liability; Negligence; Hazardous waste; State environmental policy; Endogenous policy adoption; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; D72; K13.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10518

Hefeker, Carsten.

The enlargement of the European Monetary Union is likely to lead to an increase of uncertainty about the transmission of monetary policy for the larger union. Adding new members to the central bank council will in addition imply that the preferences of the enlarged council will be uncertain in the initial period. The paper considers the influence of both types of uncertainty on wage setting behavior in the larger monetary union and its effects on unemployment. In light of these effects, implications for the adequate structure of the central bank are derived.

Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of Political Economy Theories

Palavras-chave: Monetary Policy Uncertainty; Wage Setting; European Central Bank; Euro Area; Accession Countries.; Financial Economics; Labor and Human Capital; D72; E58.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26204

Levy, Philip I..

This paper provides a rough test of a broad and prominent class of political economy of trade models and finds them wanting. The class features governments with weighted social welfare functions, including the prominent model of Grossman and Helpman. Whether the government is the single domestic player or there are other players involved (as with the lobbies in the Grossman-Helpman case) the government ultimately acts as a unitary player in international dealings. Recent work has shown that such unitary actors care exclusively about terms of trade in international negotiations. This paper pursues the implication that governments choice of trade instruments may offer a better test of the unitary government framework than existing empirical work. We use the...

Should We Expect Government Policy to Be Pareto Efficient?: The Consequences of an Arrow-Debreu Economy with Violable Property Rights

Palavras-chave: Trade policy; Lobbying; Tariffs; Political economy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; D72; F13.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28526

Bullock, David S..

To address the question, "Should we expect government policy to be efficient?" at its roots, I modify the well-known Arrow-Debreu private ownership economy, allowing property rights to be violable. The result is that equilibria tend to be Pareto inefficient.

Why Governments Tax or Subsidize Trade: Evidence from Agriculture

Palavras-chave: Pareto efficiency; Property rights; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D72; D78.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19444

Gawande, Kishore; Hoekman, Bernard.

This paper empirically explores the political-economic determinants of why governments choose to tax or subsidize trade in agriculture. We use a new data set on nominal rates of assistance (NRA) across a number of commodities spanning the last five decades for 64 countries. NRAs measure the effect on domestic (relative to world) price of the quantitative and price-based instruments used to regulate agricultural markets. The data set admits consideration of both taxes and subsidies on exports and imports. We find that both economic and political variables play important roles in determining the within-variation in the NRA data. Based on our results we offer a number of data-driven exploratory hypotheses that can inform future theoretical and empirical...

Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation

Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Agricultural price distortions; Political economy of trade policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; D72; D78; F11; H23.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50300

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, Marc.

Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The...

Pluralism and Regulatory Failure: When Should Takings Trigger Compensation?

Palavras-chave: Coalition; Fallback Process; Kingmaker Leader; Cardinally Single-peaked; Ordinally Single-peaked; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C71; C78; D72.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52337

Boyd, James; Brennan, Timothy J..

The paper evaluates the desirability of compensation for regulatory takings. To do so, we describe a public choice model in which regulators' decisions are influenced by competing political interests. We consider how the political incentives of landowners, environmentalists, and taxpayers are affected by alternative compensation rules and in turn describe the regulatory decisions made in such a pluralistic political environment. Modeling the regulator's incentives in this way leads to the conclusion that compensation should not be paid unless environmentalists and property owners have unequal influence politically. Moreover, the model has several counter-intuitive implications when political influence is not balanced. For instance, if environmentalists are...

Social Capital and Political Accountability

Palavras-chave: Regulatory takings; Compensation; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; K11; D72; L51.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10702

Nannicini, Tommaso; Stella, Andrea; Tabellini, Guido; Troiano, Ugo.

Replaced with revised version of paper 02/05/12.

Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization: Stylized facts and Hypothesis Tests

Palavras-chave: Social Capital; Culture; Political Agency; Labor and Human Capital; D72; D73; Z10.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90944

Masters, William A.; Garcia, Andres F..

This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports more than nontradables, and tax more and subsidize less where there is more land per capita. We test a variety of political-economy explanations, finding results consistent with hypothesized effects of rural and urban constituents’ rational ignorance about small per-person effects, governance institutions’ control of rent-seeking by political leaders, governments’ revenue motive for taxation, and the role of time consistency in policy-making. We also find that larger groups obtain more...