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| Registros recuperados: 17 | |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.; Palmer, Karen L.; Martinez, Salvador A.. |
| Electricity is one of the last U.S. industries in which competition is replacing regulation. We briefly review the technology for producing and delivering power, the history of electricity policy, and recent state and international experience. We then outline the major questions facing policymakers as they decide whether, when, and how to implement restructuring. We conclude with some thoughts on the California electricity crisis and other political controversies. Although the California experience has come to define what it means for electricity markets to fail, most of the problems it raised are among those we know how to solve or prevent. The still unresolved make-or-break issue remains whether the cooperation necessary to maintain reliability is... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Regulation; Deregulation; Public Economics; L51; L94; D4. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10508 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.; Boyd, James. |
| This paper explores ways in which economic analysis can help resolve the stranded cost controversy that has arisen in debates over electricity market deregulation. "Stranded costs" are costs electric utilities will not recover as power markets move from protected monopolies to an open, competitive environment. The paper begins with a description of the stranded cost problem, its magnitude, and the prominent arguments for and against recovery. We then turn to an analysis of contracts in order to understand whether there is, or should be, a legal duty to compensate utility shareholders for unrecovered costs. The paper also argues that efficient approaches to electricity deregulation will rely on more than an analysis of contracts. In particular, the politics... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Stranded costs; Deregulation; Takings; Electric utilities; Contracts; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L43; L94; K12. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10688 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Restructuring the electricity market may secure efficiencies by moving away from cost-of-service regulation, with typically (but not necessarily) time-invariant prices, and allowing prices to reflect how costs change. Charging "real time" prices requires that electricity use be measured according to when one uses it. Arguments that such real-time metering should be a policy objective promoted by subsidizing meters or delaying restructuring until meters are installed, require more than these potential benefits. They require positive externalities to imply that too few meters would be installed through private transactions. Real-time metering presents no systematic externalities when utilities must serve peak period users, and may present negative... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Real-time metering; Electricity restructuring; Deregulation; Rationing; Externalities; Industrial Organization; D45; D62; L11; L94. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10718 |
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| Ando, Amy Whritenour; Palmer, Karen L.. |
| Retail competition in electricity markets is expected to lead to more efficient electricity supply, lower electricity prices, more innovation by suppliers and a greater variety of electric power service packages. However, only a handful of states have currently gone so far as to pass legislation and/or make regulatory decisions to establish retail wheeling. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that may influence the rate at which legislators and regulators move towards establishing retail competition. In general, we find that where one interest group dominates others in the struggle for influence over the decision makers, the net effect seems to push a state forward more quickly when retail wheeling is expected to yield large efficiency gains. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Deregulation; Political economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D78; L51; L94. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10643 |
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| Balcombe, Kelvin George; Doucouliagos, Hristos; Fraser, Iain. |
| In this paper we estimate a Translog output distance function for a balanced panel of state level data for the Australian dairy processing sector. We estimate a fixed effects specification employing Bayesian methods, with and without the imposition of monotonicity and curvature restrictions. Our results indicate that Tasmania and Victoria are the most technically efficient states with New South Wales being the least efficient. The imposition of theoretical restrictions marginally affects the results especially with respect to estimates of technical change and industry deregulation. Importantly, our bias estimates show changes in both input use and output mix that result from deregulation. Specifically, we find that deregulation has positively biased the... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Bayesian; Deregulation; Output distance function; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118324 |
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| Boyd, James. |
| Progress toward electricity market deregulation has brought controversy over whether or not utilities are entitled to compensation for "stranded costs," i.e., costs utilities will not be able to recover due to the advent of competition in their markets. This paper uses a legal and economic analysis of contracts to address the desirability of utility cost recovery. First, underlying principles of law are reviewed to determine whether or not there is a legal presumption of recovery. Then, the analysis considers whether or not an implicit "regulatory compact" between utilities and regulators follows from principles in the economic analysis of law, particularly theories of efficient breach and implicit contracts. The paper concludes that recovery should occur... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Stranded costs; Deregulation; Contracts; Electric utilities; Environmental Economics and Policy; L43; L94; K12. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10803 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Residential consumers remain reluctant to choose new electricity suppliers. Even the most successful jurisdictions, four U.S. states and other countries, have had to adopt extensive consumer education procedures that serve largely to confirm that choosing electricity suppliers is daunting. Electricity is not unique in this respect; numerous studies find that consumers are generally reluctant to switch brands, even when they are well-informed about product characteristics. If consumers prefer not to choose, opening regulated markets can reduce welfare, even for some consumers who do switch, as the incumbent can exploit this preference by raising price above the formerly regulated level. Policies to open markets might be successful even if limited to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity markets; Deregulation; Consumer choice; Residential markets; Consumer/Household Economics; L94; L51; D11; B40. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10573 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Widespread concern over transmission capacity requires theoretical support to infer inadequacy from observed trends indicating reductions in the ratio of transmission to generation capacity over time. If integrated utilities had been regulated with allowed returns exceeding capital costs, transmission generation ratios would have been excessive, and observed trends might be a correction. However, numerous commentators claim that post-restructuring transmission rates have been too low, with NIMBY also discouraging investment. We model the possibility that inadequate separation between generation and transmission may result in reduced investment, in order to preserve incumbent market power in generation. However, consideration of transmission price caps and... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity transmission; Regulation; Deregulation; Vertical integration; Environmental Economics and Policy; L94; L51; L22. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10723 |
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| Registros recuperados: 17 | |
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