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| Michaelowa, Katharina; Borrmann, Axel. |
| Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Development cooperation; Evaluation; Political economy; International Development; F35; H43; D73. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26176 |
