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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Athanassoglou, Stergios (1) Benchekroun, Hassan (1) Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray (1) Fe Zeeuw, Aart (1) Kossioris, Georgios (1) Plexousakis, Michael (1) Sheriff, Glenn (1) Siegfried, Tobias (1) Tim Huh, Woonghee (1) Xepapadeas, Anastasios (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Differential Games (3) Environmental Economics and Policy (3) C73 (2) C6 (1) C61 (1) Clean Technologies (1) Climate Change (1) Common Property Resource (1) D0 (1) Ecosystems (1) Groundwater Extraction (1) Imperfect Monitoring (1) Markov Perfect Equilibrium (1) Non-linear Feedback Nash Equilibria (1) Optimal State-dependent Tax (1) Q20 (1) Q25 (1) Q54 (1) Q55 (1) Q58 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Ano 2011 (2) 2010 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última “The Voracity Effect” and Climate Change: The Impact of Clean Technologies AgEcon Benchekroun, Hassan; Chaudhuri, Amrita Ray. We show that a technological breakthrough that reduces CO2 emissions per output can exacerbate the climate change problem: countries may respond by raising their emissions resulting in an increase of the stock of pollution that may reduce welfare. Using parameter values based on empirical evidence we obtain that any 'new technology' that reduces the emissions of CO2 per dollar of GDP by less than 76% from their current level is welfare reducing. Developing clean technologies as well as transferring “cleaner” technologies to developing countries make a global post-Kyoto agreement over the control of emissions all the more urgent. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Transboundary Pollution; Renewable Resource; Climate Change; Clean Technologies; Differential Games; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q20; Q54; Q55; Q58; C73. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99642 Optimal Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Multi-cell Aquifers AgEcon Athanassoglou, Stergios; Sheriff, Glenn; Siegfried, Tobias; Tim Huh, Woonghee. Standard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we derive regulatory mechanisms for inducing the socially optimal extraction path in Markov perfect equilibrium for aquifers in which these assumptions do not hold. In spite of the complexity of the underlying system, we identify an interesting case in which a simple linear mechanism achieves the social optimum. To illustrate potential problems that can arise by erroneously imposing simplifying assumptions, we conduct a simulation based on data from the Indian state of... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Common Property Resource; Differential Games; Groundwater Extraction; Imperfect Monitoring; Markov Perfect Equilibrium; Environmental Economics and Policy; C6; D0. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102502 On the Optimal Taxation of Common-Pool Resources AgEcon Kossioris, Georgios; Plexousakis, Michael; Xepapadeas, Anastasios; Fe Zeeuw, Aart. Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state- dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Differential Games; Non-linear Feedback Nash Equilibria; Ecosystems; Optimal State-dependent Tax; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25; C73; C61. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94619 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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