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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (5) Autor Bosch, Darrell J. (1) D'Amato, Alessio (1) Di Maria, Corrado (1) Grover, Mansi (1) Jaraite, Jurate (1) Jotzo, Frank (1) Preisley, Stephen P. (1) Stranlund, John K. (1) Valentini, Edilio (1) Wood, Peter John (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Emissions Trading (5) Environmental Economics and Policy (4) Q58 (3) Risk and Uncertainty (2) Carbon Pricing (1) Carbon Sequestration (1) Carbon Tax (1) Data Envelopment Analysis (1) EU ETS (1) Emissions Taxes (1) Enforcement (1) Environmental Efficiency (1) Environmental Federalism (1) F18 (1) Hybrid Emissions Control (1) Insurance (1) K42 (1) L51 (1) Monitoring Cost (1) Natural Disaster (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (4) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2009 (2) 2008 (1) 2005 (1) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Price Floors for Emissions Trading AgEcon Wood, Peter John; Jotzo, Frank. Price floors in greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes can have advantages for technological innovation, price volatility, and management of cost uncertainty, but implementation has potential pitfalls. We argue that the best mechanism for implementing a price floor is to have firms pay an extra fee or tax. This has budgetary advantages and is more compatible with international permit trading than alternative approaches that dominate the academic and policy debate. The fee approach can also be used to implement more general hybrid approaches to emissions pricing. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Price Floor; Price Ceiling; Carbon Tax; Emissions Trading; Carbon Pricing; Price and Quantity Controls; Waxman-Markey Bill; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q58. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56211 Effects of Private Insurance on Forest Landowners' Incentives to Sequester and Trade Carbon under Uncertainty: Impact of Hurricanes AgEcon Grover, Mansi; Bosch, Darrell J.; Preisley, Stephen P.. We evaluate incentives of forest landowners for sequestering and trading carbon, given the risk of carbon loss from hurricanes, and an opportunity to insure their losses. Results of simulation model reveal that the effect of hurricane risk depends on the variability of returns from carbon and timber and landowners' ability to mitigate risk by diversifying forest holdings across regions or transferring risk by purchasing insurance. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Carbon Sequestration; Emissions Trading; Natural Disaster; Risk; Insurance; Risk and Uncertainty; Q54; Q58. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19516 A Safety Valve for Emissions Trading AgEcon Stranlund, John K.. This paper considers the optimal design of an emissions trading program that includes a safety valve tax that allows pollution sources to escape the emissions cap imposed by the aggregate supply of emissions permits. I demonstrate that an optimal hybrid emissions trading/emissions tax policy involves a permit supply that is strictly less than under a pure emissions trading scheme and a safety valve tax that exceeds the optimal pure emissions tax as long as expected marginal damage is an increasing function. While the expected level of emissions under a hybrid policy may be more or less than under pure emissions trading or a pure emissions tax, under the assumption that uncertainty about aggregate marginal abatement costs is symmetric the most likely... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions Taxes; Emissions Trading; Uncertainty; Safety Valve; Hybrid Emissions Control; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; Q28. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53125 Enforcement and Environmental Quality in a Decentralized Emission Trading System AgEcon D'Amato, Alessio; Valentini, Edilio. This paper addresses the issue of whether the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances within a federation of countries should be appointed to a unique federal regulator or decentralized to several local regulators. To this end, we develop a two stage game played by environmental regulator(s) and the polluting industries of two countries. Regulator(s) choose the amount of emission allowances to be issued and set the level of monitoring effort to achieve full compliance, while regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to be held. We identify various, possibly conflicting, spillovers among states in a decentralized setting. We show that cost advantage in favor of local regulators is not sufficient... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions Trading; Environmental Federalism; Enforcement; Monitoring Cost; Environmental Economics and Policy; F18; K42; Q53. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46654 Efficiency, Productivity and Environmental Policy: A Case Study of Power Generation in the EU AgEcon Jaraite, Jurate; Di Maria, Corrado. This study uses the EU public power generating sector as a case study to investigate the environmental efficiency and productivity enhancing performance of the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in its pilot phase. Using Data Envelopment Analysis methods, we measure the environmental efficiency and the productivity growth registered in public power generation across the EU over the 1996-2007 period. In the second stage of our analysis we attempt to explain changes in productivity and efficiency over time using state-of-the-art econometric techniques. Our analysis suggests two conclusions: on the one hand carbon pricing led to an increase in environmental efficiency and to a shift outwards of the technological frontier; on the other... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions Trading; EU ETS; Environmental Efficiency; Productivity Growth; Data Envelopment Analysis; Environmental Economics and Policy; O38; Q48; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101297 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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