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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (1) Autor Krause, Kai Oliver (1) Schade, Christian (1) Schroeder, Andreas (1) Palavra-chave Agribusiness (1) Agricultural and Food Policy (1) Coordination (1) Economic Experiment (1) Equilibrium Selection (1) Financial Economics (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Prior Outcomes (1) Prospect Game Theory (1) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (1) Risk and Uncertainty (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2010 (1) País United States (1) Idioma Inglês (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Coordination after gains and losses: Is prospect theory’s value function predictive for games? AgEcon Schade, Christian; Schroeder, Andreas; Krause, Kai Oliver. We analyze the effects of prior gain and loss experiences on individuals’ behavior in two coordination games: battle of the sexes and simultaneous market entry. We propose subjectively transformed games that integrate elements of prospect theory, aggregation of prior and subsequent payoffs, and social projection. Mathematical predictions of behavior are derived based on equilibrium selection concepts. Males’ behavior in our experimental studies is largely consistent with our predictions. However, the behavior of many female respondents appears to be rather consistent with interpreting the initial random lottery outcomes used to manipulate prior experiences as a signal for the players’ abilities to compete. This could be related to females’ known uneasiness... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Prospect Game Theory; Prior Outcomes; Coordination; Equilibrium Selection; Economic Experiment; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59524 Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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