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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Huffman, Wallace E. (1) Just, Richard E. (1) Riviere-Cinnamond, Ana (1) Palavra-chave Funding mechanisms (2) Agriculture (1) Animal health services (1) Decentralisation (1) Heterogenous ability (1) Hypothecation (1) Implicit contracting (1) Insurance (1) Livestock Production/Industries (1) Principal-agent theory (1) Public finance (1) Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies (1) Research incentives (1) Research management (1) Taxes (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2004 (1) 1999 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Funding Animal Healthcare Systems: Mechanisms and Options AgEcon Riviere-Cinnamond, Ana. Consumer-driven demand for meat and dairy products is driving an increase in livestock production and demand for improved animal healthcare services. These must be effective, affordable and accessible to ensure a profitable livestock sector. Especially important are the needs of poor livestock keepers who may have no other means of livelihood and who, following privatisation, may have become excluded from animal healthcare services. Animal healthcare has far-reaching implications. Increased livestock production brings risks to public health from greater animal-human contact and zoonotic diseases. There are potential environmental hazards as well as issues of food safety and the need to ensure trade standards are met. But effective, comprehensive animal... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Funding mechanisms; Taxes; Animal health services; Public finance; Hypothecation; Insurance; Decentralisation; Livestock Production/Industries. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23765 SETTING EFFICIENT INCENTIVES FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH: LESSONS FROM PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY II AgEcon Huffman, Wallace E.; Just, Richard E.. This paper presents one of the first systematic treatments of economic incentives in the management of academic research and major inefficiencies in common funding mechanisms. Building on well-known but unusual attributes of research whereby the research payoff is only the “"best”" of scientists'’ outputs, payoffs are highly uncertain, asymmetric information exists on scientists'’ effort, and scientists'’ are more risk averse than administrators, we consider how incentives should be structured to elicit optimal research effort and payoffs using a principal-agent model with heterogenous ability across scientists. We then conduct a systematic analysis of the implications from the model for the three major forms of agricultural experiment station... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Research management; Research incentives; Heterogenous ability; Agriculture; Principal-agent theory; Implicit contracting; Funding mechanisms; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18236 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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