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| Kirchesch, Kai. |
| The link between investment and finance usually enters the empirical literature in the form of financial constraints which are defined as the wedge between the costs of internal and external finance or as the risk of being rationed on the credit market. In this context, the sensitivity of investment with respect to single internal or external finance indicators is assumed to be appropriate to proxy for these constraints. However, enterprises that rely on external funds do not only face this external finance premium and potential borrowing limits, but also the risk of not being able to meet their repayment obligations and thus the risk of bankruptcy. If the risk of bankruptcy enters the profit maximization of the firm, the resulting empirical investment... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Investment; Bankruptcy; Financial Constaints; GMM; Financial Economics; E22; D92; G33; C23. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26185 |
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| Platt, Harlan D.; Platt, Marjorie B.. |
| For the most part, research purporting to address the issue of financial distress has actually studied samples of bankrupt companies. Financial distress and bankruptcy are different. In contrast, this paper starts with a sample of companies that are financially distressed but not yet bankrupt. The sample was obtained by screening the Compustat industry database with a three-tiered identification system. The screen bifurcated companies into financially and non-financially distressed groups. A multi-tiered screen reduces the incidence of mistakenly identifying a non-distressed company as financially distressed. The paper then compares factors indicating the likelihood of future bankruptcies to those indicating future financial distress. To do this, an early... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Financial distress; Early warning model; Renewal; Financial Economics; G30; G33. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50146 |
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| Cadot, Julien. |
| This research aims at identifying the incentives associated to collaterals in an asymmetric information context and when the bank is the main financial partner of the entrepreneurs, which is typically the case for most farms and especially in the wine sector. In one hand, collaterals may reduce the risk of overinvestment by entrepreneurs and so reduce the risk of repayment default. In the other hand, to contract collaterals may lead the bank to reduce the monitoring effort. In this paper we test these two hypotheses in taking into account the fact that entrepreneurs can benefit from a banking relationship or not. Our results confirm that collaterals’ incentives depend on the bank monitoring. Moreover, this emphasizes the uniqueness of land mortgages.... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Collaterals; Incentives; Bank monitoring; Agricultural Finance; G32; G33; G35. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103414 |
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