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The Effect on Asset Values of the Allocation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances AgEcon
Burtraw, Dallas; Palmer, Karen L.; Bharvirkar, Ranjit; Paul, Anthony.
Paradoxically, owners of existing generation assets may be better off paying for carbon dioxide emission allowances than having them distributed for free. This analysis shows that it takes just 7.5% of the revenue raised under an auction to preserve the asset values of existing generators.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Carbon dioxide; Emission allowance trading; Allocation; Electricity; Restructuring; Air pollution; Auction; Grandfathering; Generation performance standard; Outputbased allocation; Cost-effectiveness; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; Q25; Q4; L94.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10705
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Allocation of CO2 Emissions Allowances in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program AgEcon
Burtraw, Dallas; Palmer, Karen L.; Kahn, Danny.
Cap-and-trade programs for air emissions have become the widely accepted, preferred approach to cost-effective pollution reduction. One of the important design questions in a trading program is how to initially distribute the emissions allowances. Under the Acid Rain program created by Title IV of the Clean Air Act, most emissions allowances were distributed to current emitters on the basis of a historic measure of electricity generation in an approach known as grandfathering. Recent proposals have suggested two alternative approaches: allocation according to a formula that is updated over time according to some performance metric in a recent year (the share of electricity generation or something else) and auctioning allowances to the highest bidders....
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Allowance allocations; Electricity; Air pollution; Auction; Grandfathering; Generation performance standard; Output-based allocation; Cost-effectiveness; Greenhouse gases; Climate change; Global warming; Carbon dioxide; Sulfur dioxide; Nitrogen oxides; Mercury; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; Q25; Q4; L94.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10650
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The Effect of Allowance Allocation on the Cost of Carbon Emission Trading AgEcon
Burtraw, Dallas; Palmer, Karen L.; Bharvirkar, Ranjit; Paul, Anthony.
We investigate the cost-effectiveness and distributional effects of a revenue-raising auction, grandfathering, and a generation performance standard as alternative approaches for distributing carbon emission allowances in the electricity sector. We solve a detailed national electricity market model and find the auction is roughly one-half the societal cost of the other approaches. This result holds under a variety of assumptions about the future state of economic regulation and competition in the electricity sector. The differences in the cost of the approaches flow from the effect of each approach on electricity price. Grandfathering is the best for producers but it imposes a substantial cost on consumers. The generation performance standard yields the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Carbon; Emission allowance trading; Allowance allocations; Electricity; Restructuring; Air pollution; Safety valve; Auction; Grandfathering; Generation performance standard; Output-based allocation; Cost-effectiveness; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; Q25; Q4; L94.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10536
Registros recuperados: 3
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