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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (6) Autor Karp, Larry S. (4) Hennessy, David A. (1) Lee, In Ho (1) Mason, Robin (1) Rochet, Jean-Charles (1) Vives, Xavier (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Global games (6) C79 (4) Coordination games (3) Environmental Economics and Policy (3) L51 (3) Multiple equilibria (3) Q58 (3) Tradable permits (3) California AB32 (2) Climate change policies (2) Regulatory uncertainty (2) Biosecurity (1) Central Bank policy (1) Congestion (1) Coordination failure (1) Coordination problem (1) D8 (1) D84 (1) Disease insurance (1) Endemic disease (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (5) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Ano 2008 (2) 2007 (1) 2006 (1) 2003 (1) 2002 (1) País United States (6) Idioma Inglês (6)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Coordinating to Eradicate Animal Disease, and the Role of Insurance Markets AgEcon Hennessy, David A.. Farmed animal production has traditionally been a dispersed sector. Biosecurity actions relevant to eradicating infectious diseases are generally non-contractible, and might involve inordinately high transactions costs if they were contractible. If an endemic disease is to be eradicated within a region, synchronized actions need to be taken to reduce incidence below a critical mass so that spread can be contained. Using a global game model of coordination under public and private information concerning the critical mass required, this paper characterizes the success probability in an eradication campaign. As is standard in global games, heterogeneity in private signals can support a unique equilibrium. Partly because of strategic interactions, concentrated... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Biosecurity; Coordination failure; Disease insurance; Endemic disease; Global games; Market access; Public information; Veterinary public health; Livestock Production/Industries; D8; H4; Q1. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7702 Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All? AgEcon Rochet, Jean-Charles; Vives, Xavier. The classical doctrine of the Lender of Last Resort, elaborated by Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873), asserts that the Central Bank should lend to "illiquid but solvent" banks under certain conditions. Several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete: when interbank markets are efficient, a solvent bank cannot be illiquid. This paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing Bagehot's view. Our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs. We build a model of banks' liquidity crises that possesses a unique Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market. We derive policy implications... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Central Bank policy; Interbank market; Prudential regulation; Liquidity ratio; Solvency ratio; Transparency; Prompt corrective action; Orderly failure resolution; Global games; Supermodular games; Financial Economics. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26264 A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements AgEcon Karp, Larry S.; Lee, In Ho; Mason, Robin. We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent’s payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents’ strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Global games; Congestion; Coordination problem; International Relations/Trade; C79; D84. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25014 Multiplicity of investment equilibria when pollution permits are not tradable AgEcon Karp, Larry S.. We study a model in which the level of environmental regulation depends on abatement costs, which depend on aggregate levels of investment in abatement capital. Firms are non-strategic. When emissions quotas are not tradable, there are multiple competitive equilibria to the investment problem. Allowing trade in permits leads to a unique socially optimal equilibrium. For a given distribution of investment, allowing trade in permits has an ambiguous effect on the optimal level of regulation. Previous results on coordination games with non-atomic agents are applied to the problem of environmental regulation with endogenous investment in abatement capital. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Coordination games; Multiple equilibria; Global games; Environmental Economics and Policy; C79; L51; Q58. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7202 Correct (and misleading) arguments for using market based pollution control policies AgEcon Karp, Larry S.. Disagreement over the form of regulation of greenhouse gasses motivates a comparison of market based and command and control policies. More efficient policies can increase aggregate marginal abatement cost, resulting in higher emissions. Multiple investment equilibria and “regulatory uncertainty” arise when firms anticipate command and control policies. Market based policies eliminate this uncertainty. Command and control policies cause firms to imitate other firms’ investment decisions, leading to similar costs and small potential efficiency gains from trade. Market based policies induce firms to make different investment decisions, leading to different costs and large gains from trade. We imbed the regulatory problem in a “global game” and show that the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Coordination games; Multiple equilibria; Global games; Regulatory uncertainty; Climate change policies; California AB32; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C79; L51; Q58. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42868 Correct (and misleading) argument for using market-based pollution control policies AgEcon Karp, Larry S.. One argument in favor of market based pollution control policies is sometimes exaggerated, and a different argument is usually ignored. Regardless of whether investment is fixed or endogenous, market based policies might lead to a higher or lower equilibrium abatement compared to the level under command and control policies. Therefore, economists should be cautious about trying to convince anti-market environmentalists of the benefit of market based policies on the grounds that these promote environmental goals. However, market based policies reduce regulatory uncertainty. Under command and control emissions policies, there are multiple rational expectations competitive equilibria at the investment stage. From the standpoint of individual firms, this... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Coordination games; Multiple equilibria; Global games; Regulatory uncertainty; Climate change policies; California AB32; Environmental Economics and Policy; C79; L51; Q58. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6030 Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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