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| Lapatinas, Athanasios; Litina, Anastasia; Sartzetakis, Eftichios S.. |
| We construct an overlapping generations model in which agents live through two periods; childhood and adulthood. Each agent makes choices only as an adult, based on her utility that depends on her own consumption and the human capital and environmental quality endowed to her offspring. Entering adulthood, agents choose randomly between two occupations: citizens and politicians. Citizens are the only producers of a single good and choose the proportion of their income to declare to the tax authorities. Politicians decide upon the allocation of the tax revenue between environmental protection and education activities, taking as given the rates of peculation in each activity. In this context, two self-fulfilling stable equilibria can emerge, one associated... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Environmental Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H2; H26; H3; Q56; Q58. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101377 |
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| Krakowski, Michael. |
| This paper analyses the determinants of the size of the informal economy using cross-country regressions. Two sets of global data using indirect estimation techniques and the perception of business leaders for 109 countries as well as a regional set for Latin America based on direct data are used to estimate the size of the informal economies. Indirect estimation techniques arrive at higher estimates of the size of the informal economy than the perceptions of business leaders because they include not only the (fundamentally legal) activities of the informal sector, but also those activities which are illegal per se. Both kinds of estimate show strong regional differences in the size of the informal economies. Regressions on a set of indicators covering the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Informal sector; Tax evasion; Business regulation; Political Economy; O17; H26. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26313 |
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| Gandelman, Nestor. |
| In a multi community environment local authorities compete for tax base. When monitoring is imperfect, agents may decide not to pay in their community (evasion), and save the tax difference. The agent decision on where to pay taxes is based on the probability of getting caught, the fine he eventually will have to pay and the time cost of paying in a neighbor community. First, we prove that if the focus of the agents’ decision is the probability of getting caught and the fine, only the richest people evade. If instead, the key ingredient is the time cost of evading, only the poorest cheat. Second, we test the evasion pattern on the Automobile Registration System in Uruguay using two stochastic dominance tests. The evidence favors in this case the hypothesis... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Tax evasion; Stochastic dominance; H26; H77; C52. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37120 |
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