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Registros recuperados: 4
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Defending America's Food Supply Against Terrorism: Who is Responsible? Who Should Pay? AgEcon
Stinson, Thomas F.; Kinsey, Jean D.; Degeneffe, Dennis J.; Ghosh, Koel.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Q18; H44; H56.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94473
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Cleaning Up the Nuclear Weapons Complex: Exploring New Approaches AgEcon
Probst, Katherine N.; Pilling, Carolyn A.; Dunn, Karen T..
In recent years, policy experts have increasingly decried the "piecemeal" approach to environmental protection embodied in existing laws and regulations. This paper analyzes one aspect of the call for more integration: the feasibility and advisability of developing an integrated approach to regulating the cleanup of the nation's nuclear weapons complex. The Cold War has left an unprecedented set of difficulties at sites across the country where vast quantities of hazardous and radioactive materials must be properly managed. Regulatory fragmentation--particularly the phenomenon of multiple regulators and regulations driving the allocation of resources in an uncoordinated fashion--is nowhere more evident than in the current statutory and regulatory framework...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Nuclear weapons complex; Integration; Environmental law; Environmental regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; H56; K32; Q28.
Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10765
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Strategic Network Interdiction AgEcon
Hong, Sunghoon.
We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our model contributes to the literature of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Network Interdiction; Noncooperative Game of Flow; Nash Equilibrium; Power Law; Kalai-Zemel Game of Flow; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; D85; H56.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108252
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An Evaluation of the Macarena Integral Consolidation Plan (PCIM) AgEcon
Mejia, Daniel; Uribe, Maria Jose; Ibanez, Ana Maria.
This paper presents a description of the new strategy for the fight against drugs implemented in Colombia since the year 2007. The Strategic Leap Forward, as the Colombian government has called the program, or the Strategic Development Initiative, as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) calls it, is a step forward in the design of anti-drug policies that are more sustainable and effective in the mid-term. Currently, a pilot project is being implemented in the Macarena region, in the department of Meta (southeast of Bogotá), where coca crops and illicit activities were the norm just a few years ago. The Colombian State, partially financed by the United States governments and European countries, consolidates its presence in this...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Macarena; Consolidation Plan; Colombia; Anti-drug policies; Land Economics/Use; H44; H56; I38; O18.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/107426
Registros recuperados: 4
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