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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (1) Autor Dubois, Pierre (1) Vukina, Tomislav (1) Palavra-chave Contracting (1) D82 (1) Heterogenous agents (1) K32 (1) L24 (1) L51 (1) Livestock Production/Industries (1) Moral hazard (1) Production Economics (1) Q12 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Ano 2005 (1) País United States (1) Idioma Inglês (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Optimal Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data AgEcon Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav. In this paper we develop an analytical framework for the estimation of the structural model parameters of an incentive contract under moral hazard with heterogeneous agents. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we confirm that contract farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across farmers. Assuming that contracts are optimal, we obtain estimates of a lower and an upper bound of agents' reservation utilities. We show that farmers with higher risk aversion have lower outside opportunities and hence lower reservation utilities. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contracting; Heterogenous agents; Moral hazard; Livestock Production/Industries; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24645 Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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