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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Dahl, Bruce L. (2) Maxwell, Brett J. (2) Wilson, William W. (2) Palavra-chave Crop Production/Industries (2) Functional Characteristic (2) Incentive Contact (2) Principal-Agent (2) Wheat (2) Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2004 (2) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última INCENTIVE CONTRACTS TO MEET FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN WHEAT PURCHASING -- SUMMARY AgEcon Wilson, William W.; Maxwell, Brett J.; Dahl, Bruce L.. Consistency of functional characteristics in hard red spring (HRS) wheat is a concern confronting sellers and buyers. This research analyzes contract incentives for importers with respect to cost and potential risk of acceptance. A principal-agent framework is utilized to examine contract incentives. In the principal-agent contract, the principal offers the contract, the agent rejects or accepts the contract, and then decides how much effort to apply. All this is subject to risk for the agent and moral hazard for the principal. An example is presented, for which equilibrium contract terms are a base price of 454 cents per bushel for low quality wheat and a premium of 36 cents per bushel if high quality is achieved. The premium for high quality is... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentive Contact; Functional Characteristic; Wheat; Principal-Agent; Crop Production/Industries. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23559 INCENTIVE CONTRACTS TO MEET FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN WHEAT PURCHASING AgEcon Wilson, William W.; Maxwell, Brett J.; Dahl, Bruce L.. Consistency of functional characteristics in hard red spring (HRS) wheat is a concern confronting sellers and buyers. This research analyzes contract incentives for importers with respect to cost and potential risk of acceptance. A principal-agent framework is utilized to examine contract incentives. In the principal-agent contract, the principal offers the contract, the agent rejects or accepts the contract, and then decides how much effort to apply. All this is subject to risk for the agent and moral hazard for the principal. An example is presented, for which equilibrium contract terms are a base price of 454 cents per bushel for low quality wheat and a premium of 36 cents per bushel if high quality is achieved. The premium for high quality is... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentive Contact; Functional Characteristic; Wheat; Principal-Agent; Crop Production/Industries. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23617 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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