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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (1) Autor Mason, Charles F. (1) Plantinga, Andrew J. (1) Palavra-chave Additionality (1) Carbon Sequestration (1) D8 (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Incentive Contracting (1) L15 (1) Offsets (1) Q2 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2011 (1) País United States (1) Idioma Inglês (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and Additionality AgEcon Mason, Charles F.; Plantinga, Andrew J.. Governments contracting with private agents for the provision of an impure public good must contend with agents who would potentially supply the good absent any payments. This additionality problem is centrally important in the use of carbon offsets as part of climate change mitigation. Analyzing optimal contracts for forest carbon sequestration, an important offset category, we conduct a national-scale simulation using results from an econometric model of land-use change. The results indicate that for an increase in forest area of 50 million acres, annual government expenditures with optimal contracts are about $4 billion lower compared than under a uniform subsidy. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Carbon Sequestration; Incentive Contracting; Offsets; Additionality; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; D8; L15. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101290 Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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