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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (4) Autor Breustedt, Gunnar (3) Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe (3) Schilizzi, Steven (3) Walls, Margaret (1) Palavra-chave Incentive contracts (4) Agricultural policy (3) Auctions (3) Conservation tenders (3) Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Environmental policy (3) Experimental economics (3) Market-based instruments (3) Agricultural and Food Policy (2) Agrar-Umweltpolitik (1) Agrar-Umweltverträge (1) Agribusiness (1) Agricultural Finance (1) Anreizverträge (1) Asset specificity (1) Auktionen (1) Ausschreibungsverfahren (1) C92 (1) D44 (1) D82 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2011 (2) 2010 (1) 2003 (1) País United States (4) Idioma Inglês (4)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última How Local Governments Structure Contracts with Private Firms: Economic Theory and Evidence on Solid Waste and Recycling Contracts AgEcon Walls, Margaret. Solid waste management services are contracted out to private firms in many U.S. communities. Household waste collection, transport, and disposal are relatively straightforward services to define within the terms of a contract. The addition of recycling, however, significantly complicates matters. How should contracts be structured to provide incentives for recycling? Who should own key facilities, such as recyclable materials processing facilities? Should a separate contract for processing and sale of materials be used, or should these services be provided by government employees or purely private markets? These questions are addressed in this study using the principal-agent framework and the theory of incomplete contracts in economics. I explain stylized... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentive contracts; Asset specificity; Principal-agent models; Waste collection; Recycling; Environmental Economics and Policy; L33; L14; Q2. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10707 Does tendering conservation contracts with performance payments generate additional benefits? AgEcon Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe. Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to supply non-marketed environmental services may need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and submitting the contracts to competitive tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the potential benefits of both approaches. Landholders’ risk aversion to only partially controlled outcomes may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Controlled lab experiments were designed on the basis of a theoretical model and were run in two countries, with varying rates of payments linked to environmental outcomes. Results... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C92; D44; D82; D86; H57; Q24; Q28. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100883 AUCTIONING OUTCOME-BASED CONSERVATION CONTRACTS AgEcon Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar. This paper explores two ideas to enhance the performance of agri-environmental contracting schemes: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Controlled lab experiments were run in two countries, systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to environmental outcomes. This paper clarifies the conditions under which the benefits from combining tenders with incentive payments outweigh the costs. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Auktionen; Ausschreibungsverfahren; Agrar-Umweltverträge; Agrar-Umweltpolitik; Anreizverträge; Experimentelle Ökonomie; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Demand and Price Analysis; Political Economy. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114523 Should we combine incentive payments and tendering for efficiently purchasing conservation services from landholders? AgEcon Schilizzi, Steven; Breustedt, Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe. Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to provide non-marketed environmental services need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Landholder risk aversion may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Using controlled lab experiments in two countries and across four subject groups, and systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to uncertain outcomes, this paper clarifies the conditions under which incentives overcome... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59159 Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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