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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Karlan, Dean S. (2) Zinman, Jonathan (2) Bryan, Gharad (1) Palavra-chave Financial Economics (2) Information asymmetries (2) Adverse selection (1) C9 (1) C93 (1) Consumer/Household Economics (1) Credit market failures (1) Credit markets (1) D12 (1) D14 (1) D8 (1) D82 (1) Development finance (1) Field experiment (1) G2 (1) G3 (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) International Development (1) Microfinance (1) Moral hazard (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working Paper (1) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2005 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment AgEcon Bryan, Gharad; Karlan, Dean S.; Zinman, Jonathan. We examine a randomized trial that allows separate identification of peer screening and enforcement of credit contracts. A South African microlender offered half its clients a bonus for referring a friend who repaid a loan. For the remaining clients, the bonus was conditional on loan approval. After approval, the repayment incentive was removed from half the referrers in the first group and added for half those in the second. We find large enforcement effects, a $12 (100 Rand) incentive reduced default by 10 percentage points from a base of 20%. In contrast, we find no evidence of screening. Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Information asymmetries; Credit market failures; Peer networks; Social capital; Social networks; Consumer/Household Economics; Financial Economics; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; C93; D12; D14; D82; O12; O16. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121674 Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment AgEcon Karlan, Dean S.; Zinman, Jonathan. Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the empirical importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major South African lender along three dimensions: 1) the initial "offer interest rate" appearing on direct mail solicitations; 2) a "contract interest rate" equal to or less than the offer interest rate and revealed to the over 4,000 borrowers who agreed to the initial offer rate; and 3) a dynamic repayment incentive that extends preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remain in good standing. These three randomizations, combined with complete knowledge of the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Information asymmetries; Field experiment; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Development finance; Credit markets; Microfinance; Financial Economics; C9; D8; G2; G3; O1. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28482 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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