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	Provedor de dados ArchiMer (4) AgEcon (1) Autor Istpm, - (3) Bonhommeau, Sylvain (1) Do, Kim Hang Pham (1) Folmer, Henk (1) Guillotreau, Patrice (1) Selles, Jules (1) Vallee, Thomas (1) Mais... Palavra-chave International fisheries (5) Data (3) Agribusiness (1) Common-pool resources (1) Competitive equilibrium (1) Crop Production/Industries (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Experimental economics (1) Fisheries management (1) Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety (1) Games in partition function form (1) Modified Shapley value (1) Overexploitation (1) Partial cooperation (1) Policy making (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Tipping points (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Text (4) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Ano 2020 (1) 2004 (1) 1972 (1) 1971 (1) 1970 (1) País France (4) United States (1) Idioma Francês (3) Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Statistiques ISTPM de pêches - année 1969 ArchiMer Istpm, -. Tipo: Text Palavras-chave: Data; International fisheries. Ano: 1970 URL: http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/1970/publication-2230.pdf Statistiques ISTPM de pêches - année 1971 ArchiMer Istpm, -. Tipo: Text Palavras-chave: Data; International fisheries. Ano: 1972 URL: http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/1972/publication-2234.pdf Statistiques ISTPM de pêches - année 1970 ArchiMer Istpm, -. Tipo: Text Palavras-chave: Data; International fisheries. Ano: 1971 URL: http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/1971/publication-2235.pdf Can the Threat of Economic Sanctions Ensure the Sustainability of International Fisheries? An Experiment of a Dynamic Non-cooperative CPR Game with Uncertain Tipping Point ArchiMer Selles, Jules; Bonhommeau, Sylvain; Guillotreau, Patrice; Vallee, Thomas. Complex dynamic systems such as common-pool resource systems can undergo a critical shift at a given threshold, the so-called tipping point, which potentially requires substantial changes from the management system. We present in this research a framed laboratory experiment design to examine how the threat of economic sanctions influences the strategic management of a common-pool resource. We use the context of the East Atlantic bluefin tuna international fishery as it has been the archetype of an overfished and mismanaged fishery until a dramatic reinforcement of its regulations followed the threat of a trade ban. We consider endogenous threats and examine their effects on cooperation through harvest decisions taken in the context of non-cooperative game... Tipo: Text Palavras-chave: Common-pool resources; Experimental economics; Fisheries management; International fisheries; Policy making; Tipping points. Ano: 2020 URL: https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00623/73488/72786.pdf Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form AgEcon Do, Kim Hang Pham; Folmer, Henk. This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery in the context of partial cooperation. We analyse the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants. We demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from both partial and full cooperations. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: International fisheries; Overexploitation; Partial cooperation; Games in partition function form; Competitive equilibrium; Modified Shapley value; Agribusiness; Crop Production/Industries; Environmental Economics and Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97792 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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