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| Campo, Maria Luz. |
| This paper studies the interaction between the performance of firms and unions and the environmental policy chosen by governments when there is a negative environmental externality from production of a good which only affects the country where the firm is located. I assume that governments choose an upper limit on emissions, unions choose the wage rates and firms choose the employment level. Specifically, I analyze the effect that unionized labor markets have on environmental policy. Resumen: En este artículo estudiamos el efecto del comportamiento de empresas y trabajadores sobre la política medioambiental, cuando existe contaminación local. Suponemos que el gobierno elige la política medioambiental, basada en un límite sobre las emisiones, mientras que... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Monopoly union model; Emission standards; Environmental Economics and Policy; J30; J51; Q28. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28730 |
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| Johnston, James. |
| One aspect of the study of executive remuneration that has received comparatively little attention is its ability to shed light on the governance of the corporation. The level of a Chief Executive Officer’s remuneration will embody information on both the market within which a business operates and the effectiveness of its independent directors as instruments of corporate governance. Differences in the salaries of top directors that cannot be accounted for by differences in business performance may provide useful evidence on the health of a company’s governance mechanisms. This paper contains the results of an empirical investigation into the role of external competition and internal controls in generating the executive salaries that we observe in the... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: CEO remuneration; Independent directors; Corporate governance reform; Financial Economics; J30; M52. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50160 |
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| Moller, Joachim. |
| The aim of the paper is to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing regional adjustment processes after idiosyncratic shocks. The model builds on the macroeconomic approach with monopolistic competition on goods and labor markets. It is shown how interregional factor mobility affects wage-setting behavior and labor supply. The dynamics of this extended model are explicitly taken into account. For a special case we can derive the characteristics of the adjustment process analytically. Under certain conditions the model exhibits hysteresis, i.e. temporary shocks on the price level or the unemployment rate can have a permanent effect on production and potential labor supply. It is argued that a suitable method for investigating regional adjustment... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Regional adjustments; Wage formation; Wage-price spiral; Migration; Regional unemployment; Hysteresis; Labor and Human Capital; J30. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26180 |
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| Conrad, Klaus; Loschel, Andreas. |
| Computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling has provided a number of important insights about the interplay between environmental tax policy and the pre-existing tax system. In this paper, we emphasize that a labor market policy of recycling tax revenues from an environmental tax to lower employers’ non-wage labor cost depends on how the costs of labor are modeled. We propose an approach, which combines neoclassical substitutability and fixed factor proportions. Our concept implies a user cost of labor which consists of the market price of labor plus the costs of inputs associated with the employment of a worker. We present simulation results based on a CO2 tax and the recycling of its revenues to reduce the non-wage labor cost. One simulation is based... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Market-based environmental policy; Carbon taxes; Double dividend; Computable general equilibrium modeling; D58; J30; Q25. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37115 |
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| Polanski, Arnold; Lazarova, Emiliya A.. |
| We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players’ payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type’s equilibrium payoff as market frictions vanish. The limit payoff of a type depends in an intuitive way on the supply and the demand for this type in the market, adjusted by the type-specific bargaining power. Our framework may be viewed as an alternative to the Walrasian price-setting mechanism. When we apply this methodology to the analysis of labor markets, we can determine endogenously the equilibrium firm size... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Multilateral Bargaining; Dynamic Markets; Labor Markets; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; C78; J30; L20. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108255 |
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