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The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions 31
Boyd, James; Caballero, Kathryn; Simpson, R. David.
There is a growing interest in incentive-based policies to motivate conservation by landowners. These policies include full- and partial-interest land purchases, tax-based incentives, and tradable or bankable development rights. Using legal and economic analysis, the paper explores potential pitfalls associated with the use of such policies. Incentive-based policies promise to improve the cost effectiveness of habitat preservation, but only if long-run implementation issues are meaningfully addressed. While we compare conservation policies, particular attention is devoted to the use of conservation easements and in particular a set of easement contracts and transactions in the state of Florida. The easement analysis highlights the importance of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Habitat conservation; Conservation easements; Land use policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q15; K11; R52.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10587
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Pluralism and Regulatory Failure: When Should Takings Trigger Compensation? 31
Boyd, James; Brennan, Timothy J..
The paper evaluates the desirability of compensation for regulatory takings. To do so, we describe a public choice model in which regulators' decisions are influenced by competing political interests. We consider how the political incentives of landowners, environmentalists, and taxpayers are affected by alternative compensation rules and in turn describe the regulatory decisions made in such a pluralistic political environment. Modeling the regulator's incentives in this way leads to the conclusion that compensation should not be paid unless environmentalists and property owners have unequal influence politically. Moreover, the model has several counter-intuitive implications when political influence is not balanced. For instance, if environmentalists are...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulatory takings; Compensation; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; K11; D72; L51.
Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10702
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INSTITUTIONS AND SUSTAINABLE LAND USE: THE CASE OF FOREST AND GRAZING LANDS IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA 31
Gebreegziabher, Zenebe.
Land is an essential factor of production for agriculture, horticulture, forestry as well as other land related activities. Institutions that govern its use determine the sustainability and efficient use of this essential resource. In Ethiopia all land is publicly owned. Such an institutional setting has resulted in major degradation of Ethiopia’s land resources and dissipation of the resource rent, as available forest and grazing lands are exploited in a suboptimal fashion. An alternative to current institutional setting is to assign private property institution, but this will lead to welfare costs. In this paper, we examine the welfare effects (from consumer perspective) of change in institutional setting to forest and grazing lands using a unique data...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Institutions; Sustainable land use; Economic welfare.; Environmental Economics and Policy; K11; Q12; Q2; Q28.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51639
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Unprotected Resources and Voracious World Markets 31
Margolis, Michael; Shogren, Jason F..
The Theory of the Second Best implies that any country with less-than-ideal resources can lose from international trade. Recently it has been suggested this means the South (poor countries) are better off suppressing trade with the North, especially trade in natural resource products, since the North has better developed rights to protect its natural resources. Here we show that the suppression of such trade may also impede the development of property rights in the South, but that even taking this into account, trade liberalization need not improve Southern welfare. We find that within a cone of world prices on the boundary of which lies the South's autarky price vector, welfare losses still occur even when local governments in the South make optimal...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International trade; Property rights; Natural resources; Environment; Second best; Institutional change; Development; International Relations/Trade; F02; F10; F18; K11; O10; O19.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10635
Registros recuperados: 4
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