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| Registros recuperados: 63 | |
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| Lesur-irichabeau, Gabrielle; Guyader, Olivier; Fresard, Marjolaine; Leroy, C.; Latouche, K.; Le Grel, L.. |
| The aim of this article is to explore, through a hedonic approach, the factors that might explain the price variability for the French-managed fishery of scallop at primary fish markets. In addition to factors classically identified in the current literature like intrinsic product characteristics or markets situation, the characteristics of operators are tested. The relationships of loyalty between sellers and buyers, and market assiduity are notably considered. |
| Tipo: Text |
Palavras-chave: Buyer and seller characteristics; Fisheries management; Hedonic price; Market behaviour; Market structure; Scallop; Q21; Q22; Q28; C10; L11. |
| Ano: 2016 |
URL: http://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00301/41252/40442.pdf |
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| Ahearn, Mary Clare; Korb, Penelope J.; Banker, David E.. |
| This paper examines the industrialization process of U.S. agriculture by examining the trends in the number of farms, the concentration of production during the last decade, and the dynamics of farm survivability, entry, and exit underlying aggregate statistics. We next examine vertical coordination as part of the industrialization process and highlight contracting in the poultry industry. The analysis provides evidence that production is continuing to be concentrated on a smaller number of farms at a relatively rapid rate, in spite of the stability in the number of farms. Although contracting clearly dominates the broiler industry, it is less prevalent in egg and turkey production, where other forms of vertical coordination are likely established. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Broilers; Contracting; Eggs; Industrialization; Poultry; Structural change; Turkeys; Vertical integration; D23; D40; L11; L14 L22; L23; Q12. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43511 |
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| Auriol, Emmanuelle; Schilizzi, Steven. |
| This paper analyzes the problem raised by quality provision in globalizing economies. When quality is a credence attribute, there is a signaling problem and quality drops to its minimum level. A way out of this under-provision equilibrium consists to rely on certification. However certification of goods involves costs, most of which are fixed, because to credibly signal quality, the certification process has to be carry out by an independent authority above all suspicion. The certification costs, which might justify a centralized intervention, become a major force in deciding market structure. Then in a given population the rate of certification depends on the consumers' wealth and size. If the population is too poor the market for certification collapses... |
| Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy; Crop Production/Industries; D11; D21; L11; L15.. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123598 |
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| Sorensen, Ann-Christin. |
| The food processing industry in Western countries operates in markets that usually are highly concentrated, consisting of a few cooperatives and investor-owned firms. However, in the literature some studies questioned whether the mixed market structure is a stable equilibrium, and suggestions are made that the cooperatives eventually will crowd out all investor-owned firms. To analyse the problem, the family of models of mixed markets is generalized and analysed. It is shown that a mixed market equilibrium may occur under quite general conditions. Also, it is shown that the investor-owned firm may serve as a yardstick of production to the cooperative, helping farmers achieve an increased payoff relative to a situation with a single coop in the market. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Endogenous membership; Investor-owned-firm; Mixed market; Yardstick of production; Agribusiness; L11; L13; P12; P13; Q13. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24741 |
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| Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce the information gap, consumers can rely on standards (labels, certifications, geographic indications) that insure quality and origin of the goods. However, these standards do not always fully reveal information. Some of them may just signal that the good is more likely to be of high quality. We investigate what kind of standards are most desirable for producers, and for society in general knowing that any system is costly to implement. One of our findings is that for intermediate values of certification costs, certification that fully reveals information makes high quality producers better off, but make the entire industry worse off. In this case, the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality.; Consumer/Household Economics; L11; L15; D82; D71. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19510 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Restructuring the electricity market may secure efficiencies by moving away from cost-of-service regulation, with typically (but not necessarily) time-invariant prices, and allowing prices to reflect how costs change. Charging "real time" prices requires that electricity use be measured according to when one uses it. Arguments that such real-time metering should be a policy objective promoted by subsidizing meters or delaying restructuring until meters are installed, require more than these potential benefits. They require positive externalities to imply that too few meters would be installed through private transactions. Real-time metering presents no systematic externalities when utilities must serve peak period users, and may present negative... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Real-time metering; Electricity restructuring; Deregulation; Rationing; Externalities; Industrial Organization; D45; D62; L11; L94. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10718 |
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| Registros recuperados: 63 | |
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