SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Yu, Li; Orazem, Peter F.; Jolly, Robert W..

Rural firms have a higher survival rate than urban firms. Over the first 13 years after firm entry, the hazard rate for firm exits is persistently higher for urban firms. While differences in firm attributes explain some of the rural-urban gap in firm survival, rural firms retain a survival advantage 18.5% greater than observationally equivalent urban firms. We argue that in competitive markets, the remaining survival advantage for rural firms must be attributable to unobserved factors that must be known at the time of entry. A plausible candidate for such a factor is thinner markets for the capital of failed rural firms. The implied lower salvage value of rural firms suggests that firms sorting into rural markets must have a higher probability of success...

What Motivates Farms to Associate? The Case of Two Competing Czech Agricultural Associations

Palavras-chave: Rural; Urban; Entry; Exit; Survival; Sorting; Salvage value; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Demand and Price Analysis; Financial Economics; Industrial Organization; Labor and Human Capital; Marketing; Production Economics; Productivity Analysis; Risk and Uncertainty; O18; L21; D92.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54081

Bavorova, Miroslava; Curtiss, Jarmila.

The study investigates determinants of affiliation with the two strongest associations in Czech agriculture. These represent Agricultural Association grouping large-scale enterprises and Association of Private Farmers, respectively. Our objective is to analyze whether associations with different types of members (large-scale enterprises vs. private farmers) experience different motives for joining or lapsing. Moreover, we investigate if there are characteristics of the associations' members which positively correlate to membership. The results imply that political lobbying is the main entry incentive for both large-scale enterprises and individual farmers. Informal information exchange is a more significant motivation for private farmers than for...

Palavras-chave: Associations; Agricultural enterprises; Czech agriculture; Selective incentives; Individual farms; Transition; Farm Management; D71; D72; D73; L14; L21; L22; C35.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25770

Learning from Experts

Valsecchi, Irene.

The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent, and the non-expert, who is either a decision-maker or an evaluator of the expert’s performance. According to the Bayesian decision-theoretic approach the expert is the agent who announces his probabilistic opinion, and the non-expert has to incorporate that opinion into his beliefs in a consistent way, despite his poor understanding of the expert’s substantive knowledge. The two approaches ground the relationships between experts and non-experts on such different...

Cooperatives, Regulation and Competition in Norwegian Agriculture

Palavras-chave: Expert; Information Transmission; Learning; D81; L21.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36756

Tennbakk, Berit.

Over production is a persistent and costly problem in Norwegian agriculture. Support to agricultural production implicitly yields incentives to produce too much, i.e., causing market prices to fall below the target level, and thereby increasing the need for subsidies and additional market interventions. In order to restrict supplies, farmers are allowed to coordinate through marketing cooperatives. The paper argues that this coordination is likely to be insufficient in markets where the cooperative competes with an investor-owned wholesaler. Interventions in the market in order to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production. Levying a tax on all production in order to cover market regulation costs, moves the solution in the...

Protection of Intellectual Property while Outsourcing

Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Regulation; Over production; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13; L21; D43.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24907

Sen Gupta, Rajorshi; Love, H. Alan.

Food and Beverage companies need to share their Intellectual Property (IP) when they outsource production and/or R&D to contract agents. IP sharing can facilitate misappropriation and the contractor may eventually start competing with the client. We design an incentive compatible contract that can protect company IP. A two-pronged strategy is proposed: Companies should share less know-how and give high incentive payments to deter IP misappropriation. Strategies like product differentiation may be highly useful to deter piracy.

Corporate Strategies in the Telecommunications Sector in an Environment of Continuing Liberalization

Palavras-chave: Intellectual Property Protection; Outsourcing; Product Differentiation; R&D; Agribusiness; Industrial Organization; Risk and Uncertainty; L14; L21; L23; L66; 031; 032; 034.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103856

Borrmann, Christine.

Palavras-chave: International Business; Telecommunications; Deregulation; International Relations/Trade; F23; L21; L96.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26319

Experts and Non-experts

Valsecchi, Irene.

The paper is concerned with the interaction between two agents: an expert, announcing his probability that a particular state of the world will occur, and a non-expert decision-maker, who takes action according to his posterior beliefs. The decision-maker considers the expert an experiment of uncertain reliability and takes the received messages as the outcomes of such an experiment. The model of the expert in the decision-makers mind bears no relation with any measure of the experts actual information. The paper shows that messages will be biased, notwithstanding solidarity between the agents. However, the longer the interaction, the less severe will be the bias.

Creating a Vision for XYZ Research Corporation: A Case Study

Palavras-chave: Opinion; Expert; Instructions; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D81; L21.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8647

Jaramillo, Paul E.; House, Lisa; Wysocki, Allen F..

A strategic analysis was developed for XYZ Research Corporation (the true company's name is disguised). The strategic analysis involved a series of visits to the company to conduct focus groups with its employees and management. Five focus groups were carried out at XYZ Research Corporation. This method proved to be effective and valuable when aiming to gather detailed information on the specifics of a firm's operation. Information and insights on the company and its business that would not become evident through any kind of meticulous financial or economic analysis of the company's and industry's numbers - which in fact were unavailable or scarce - was efficiently obtained by personal communication from the employees in the interviews. The focus group...

Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green Consumers and Responsible Firms: A Comparative Statics Analysis

Palavras-chave: Focus Groups; Strategic Analysis; Food Safety; Outsourcing; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; A22; C99; L21; M10.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19476

Doni, Nicola; Ricchiuti, Giorgio.

This paper analyzes how the interaction between green consumers and responsible firms affects the market equilibrium. The main result is that a higher responsibility by both producers and consumers can have different impacts on the efficiency of the firms’ abatement activity, depending on the nature of the cleaning costs. When the abatement costs are fixed, the efficiency of the clean-up effort is always increasing in their degree of responsibility. On the other hand, when the abatement costs are variable, a higher level of responsibility may reduce social welfare. Finally, the first best allocation is never reached, even in the presence of the highest credible level of responsibility of both consumers and producers.