|
|
|
|
|
| Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Ronde, Thomas. |
| This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Monopolization Practices; Vertical Agreements; Financial Economics; L12; L40; L42. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56213 |
| |
|
|
| Rossini, Gianpaolo; Vergari, Cecilia. |
| In many industries it is quite common to observe firms delegating the production of essential inputs to independent ventures jointly established with competing rivals. The diffusion of this arrangement and the favourable stance of competition authorities call for the assessment of the social and private desirability of Input Production Joint Ventures (IPJV), which represent a form of input production cooperation, not investigated so far. IPJV can be seen as an intermediate organizational setting lying between the two extremes of vertical integration and vertical separation. Our investigation is based on an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated goods. We characterize the conditions under which IPJV is privately optimal finding that firms’... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Input Production Joint Venture; Horizontal Differentiation; Oligopoly; Production Economics; L24; L42. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55288 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Hamilton, Stephen F.; Innes, Robert. |
| This paper considers vertical restraints in a multi-market retail setting in which each retailer sells the complete line of manufactured goods. Vertical restraints by one manufacturer on the retailers of its product serve as an instrument to exert horizontal control over the retail price of a rival manufactured good. Applications are developed for supermarket retailing, where the manufacturer of a national brand sold at both supermarkets can employ vertical restraints to control the pricing of the retailer's competing private labels, and for the personal computer industry, where the manufacturer of an essential computer component can use vertical restraints to control the pricing of complementary components bundled with the essential component by... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracting; Vertical restraints; Monopolization.; Marketing; L13; L14; L42; D43.. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21424 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Chambolle, Claire; Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto. |
| This paper shows that retailers may choose to offer products differentiated in quality to consumers, not to relax downstream competition, but to improve their buyer power in the negotiation with their supplier. We consider a simple vertical industry where two producers sell products differentiated in quality to two retailers who operate in separated markets. In the game, first retailers choose which product to carry, then each retailer and her chosen producer bargain over the terms of a two-part tariff contract and retailers finally choose the quantities. When upstream production costs are convex, the share of the total profits going to the retailer would be higher if they choose to differentiate. We thus isolate the wish to differentiate as "only" due to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Buyer Power; Product line; Differentiation; Marketing; L13; L42. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6866 |
| |
|
|
| Buhler, Benno. |
| We develop a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNOs) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. The operators own a network infrastructure only in their home country. To allow their subscribers to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by foreign MNOs. We show that in absence of international alliances and capacity restrictions, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit prices down to marginal costs. However, operators prefer to form international alliances in which members mutually provide roaming services at inefficiently high wholesale prices. Alliances serve as a commitment device to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Roaming; Vertical Relations; Regulation; Industrial Organization; D43; L13; L42; L96. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55292 |
| |
|
|
|
