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Registros recuperados: 11
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Competition Regimes in Telecommunications and the International Trading System AgEcon
Koopmann, Georg.
In most countries, competition in the telecommunications industry is subject to both sector-specific regulation and more general antitrust policies. At the same time, a process of international market liberalisation is under way in telecommunications which can only be truly effective - and further advance - if appropriate competitive safeguards are in place. Trading partners should agree on certain minimum standards to be observed in this area in order to better combat anticompetitive conduct and avoid international conflicts. The Reference Paper to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications is an important step in this direction and may also serve as a model for other network industries. It is a framework of rules which has to be filled with concrete...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulation; Antitrust; Trade Negotiations; Services; International Relations/Trade; F13; L40; L50; L89.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26230
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Competition, Regulation and Privatisation of Electricity Generation in Developing Countries: Does the Sequencing of the Reforms Matter? AgEcon
Zhang, Yingang; Parker, David; Kirkpatrick, Colin.
Recent years have seen countries introducing reform of their utility industries with a view to promoting private ownership and competition. This paper studies the effect of the sequencing of privatisation, competition and regulation reforms in electricity generation using data from 25 developing countries for the period 1985 to 2001. A fixed effects panel data model is used. The study finds that establishing an independent regulatory authority and introducing competition before privatisation is correlated with higher electricity generation, higher generation capacity and, in the case of the sequence of competition before privatisation, improved capital utilisation.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Privatisation; Competition; Regulation; Developing economies; Economic performance.; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L33; L43; L44; L50; 012; O38; O50.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/30599
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Non-Constant Discounting in Continuous Time AgEcon
Karp, Larry S..
This note derives the dynamic programming equation (DPE) to a differentiable Markov Perfect equilibrium in a problem with non-constant discounting and general functional forms. We begin with a discrete stage model and take the limit as the length of the stage goes to 0 to obtain the DPE corresponding to the continuous time problem. We characterize the multiplicity of equilibria under non-constant discounting and discuss the relation between a given equilibrium of that model and the unique equilibrium of a related problem with constant discounting. We calculate the bounds of the set of candidate steady states and we Pareto rank the equilibria.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Hyperbolic discounting; Time consistency; Markov equilibria; Non-uniqueness; Observational equivalence; Pareto efficiency; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D83; L50.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25050
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Dynamic Quotas with Learning AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Costello, Christopher.
We study the optimal quota sequence, in a stationary environment, where a regulator and a non-strategic firm have asymmetric information, The regulator is able to learn about the unknown cost parameter by using a quota that is slack with positive probability, It is never optimal for the regulator to learn gradually, In the first period, he either ignores the possibility of learning, or he tries to improve his information, Regardless of the outcome in the first period, he never experiments in subsequent periods.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Quotas; Asymmetric information; Searching; International Relations/Trade; D83; L50.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6245
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The Effects of Environmental Regulation On Technology Diffusion: The Case of Chlorine Manufacturing AgEcon
Snyder, Lori D.; Miller, Nolan; Stavins, Robert N..
We use a hazard model to estimate the effect of environmental regulation on the diffusion of membrane cell production technology in the chlorine manufacturing industry. We estimate the effect of regulation on both the adoption of the membrane technology at existing plants and on the exit of existing plants using older technologies. We find that environmental regulation did affect the diffusion of the cleaner technology in the chlorine industry. However, it did so not by encouraging the adoption of membrane cells by existing facilities, but by reducing the demand for chlorine and hence encouraging the shutdown of facilities using the environmentally inferior options.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Regulation; Technological change; Environment; Hazard model; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q20; Q28; L50; L65.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10554
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INCENTIVES AND STANDARDS IN AGENCY CONTRACTS AgEcon
Chambers, Robert G..
This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multi-tasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multi-tasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multi-tasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs. When the noncontractible outputs are socially undesirable and risk substitutes, standards are never optimal. If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentives; Multi-tasking; Agency; Risk complementarity; Risk substitutability; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty; D82; L23; L50.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28605
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Implementation of Policy Instruments for Chlorinated Solvents: A Comparison of Design Standards, Bans, and Taxes to Phase Out Trichloroethylene AgEcon
Slunge, Daniel; Sterner, Thomas.
This paper studies the Swedish prohibition of the hazardous solvent Trichloroethylene (TCE). Sweden is alone in completely prohibiting its use. The ban has been at best a partial success and illustrates the dilemmas of policymaking. Use has declined but not stopped, largely because the decision to ban TCE was challenged in the courts. Recently, the EU Court of Justice decided in favor of Sweden's right to have a ban. This article analyzes abatement cost data to show that the cost of replacing TCE is low for most plants, although there appear to be a few firms for which it may be quite high. A cross-country comparison indicates that the Swedish ban was less effective than the very strict technical requirements in Germany or the tax used in Norway. A tax (or...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Hazardous chemicals; Regulation; Environmental tax; Solvents; Environmental Economics and Policy; D62; L50; Q28; K32.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10516
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Calculating the Costs of Environmental Regulation AgEcon
Pizer, William A.; Kopp, Raymond J..
Decisions concerning environmental protection hinge on estimates of economic burden. Over the past 30 years, economists have developed and applied various tools to measure this burden. In this paper, developed as a chapter for the Handbook of Environmental Economics, we present a taxonomy of costs along with methods for measuring those costs. At the broadest level, we distinguish between partial and general equilibrium costs. Partial equilibrium costs represent the burden directly borne by the regulated entity (firms, households, government), including both pecuniary and nonpecuniary expenses, when prices are held constant. General equilibrium costs reflect the net burden once all good and factor markets have equilibrated. In addition to partial...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Social cost; Cost-benefit; Cost-effectiveness; Environmental regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q20; Q28; H41; L50; D58.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10762
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AN AGENDA FOR THE DESIGN AND STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AgEcon
Batabyal, Amitrajeet A..
The combination of a general greening of international political debate, and the events of 1992 at the Rio Earth summit have led to great interest in the question of global environmental protection. While it is recognized that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are the means by which the earth’s fragile environment is most likely to be protected, this recognition has been recent. Hence, there is very little formal research on the design and study of IEAs. As such, in this paper, I propose and describe a research agenda for the design and study of IEAs. Very generally, I propose that we frame the IEA design question as a problem in mechanism design. We will then be able to use, inter alia, the theory of common agency and the theory of hierarchies...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International; Environmental; Agreement; Design; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; D73; D82; L50.
Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28353
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Global Warming and Hyperbolic Discounting AgEcon
Karp, Larry S..
The use of a constant discount rate to study long-lived environmental problems such as global warming has two disadvantages: the prescribed policy is sensitive to the discount rate, and with moderate discount rates, large future damages have almost no effect on current decisions. Time-consistent quasi-hyperbolic discounting alleviates both of these modeling problems, and is a plausible description of how people think about the future. We analyze the time-consistent Markov Perfect equilibrium in a general model with a stock pollutant. The solution to the linear-quadratic specialization illustrates the role of hyperbolic discounting in a model of global warming.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Stock pollutant; Hyperbolic discounting; Global warming; Time consistency; Environmental Economics and Policy; D83; L50.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25069
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Market Structure and Environmental Innovation AgEcon
Montero, Juan-Pablo.
This paper studies firms’ incentives to invest in environmental R&D under different market structures (Cournot and Bertrand) and environmental policy instruments (emission standards, taxes, tradable permits and auctioned permits). Because of market strategic effects, R&D incentives vary widely across market structures and instruments. For example, when firms’ products are strategic substitutes (i.e., Cournot), either emission standards, taxes or auctioned permits can provide the most incentives. But when firms’ products are strategic complements, either taxes or auctioned permits provide the most incentives. If markets are perfectly competitive, however, permits and emission standards offer similar incentives that are lower than those offered by...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Environment; Regulation; Market structure; Innovation; Marketing; Environmental Economics and Policy; L13; L50; Q28.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44294
Registros recuperados: 11
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