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| Saak, Alexander E.. |
| Many cases of externalities in agricultural production, such as pesticide drift, cross-pollination, and offensive odors, are attributable to the incompatibility of neighboring land uses and exhibit distance dependence. We characterize equilibrium spatial patterns of externality-generating and -receiving land uses on a two-dimensional lattice with noncooperative, profit-maximizing producers. In equilibrium, generators or recipients form one or more neighborhoods with certain geometric properties, depending on how an externality dissipates with distance and whether there is an externality generated outside the region's boundaries. Efficient land-use arrangements maximize social welfare subject to the implementability constraints stipulating that no... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Graph partitioning; Land-use arrangement; Spatial externality; Supermodular game; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18501 |
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