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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Previous literature has shown that competition among regional governments may lead to inefficiently low levels of capital taxation, because governments do not take account of the external benefits of capital flight to other regions. However, the fiscal distortion is smaller the more elastic the supply of capital (for the region bloc), if governments are not perfectly competitive, or they behave in part as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan. There has been very little empirical work on the magnitude of the welfare effects of fiscal competition. This paper presents extensive calculations of the welfare effects using a model that incorporates the possibility of Leviathan behavior, strategic behavior by governments, monopsony power in factor markets, and a wide... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Fiscal competition; Tax harmonization; Welfare costs; Leviathan; Strategic behavior; Public Economics; H73; H21; H23. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10848 |
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| Yamaguchi, Chikara. |
| This paper investigates properties of the second best allocation in a federation where regional governments provide a pure public good non-cooperatively and policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self-serving. A high degree of household mobility across regions forces the governments to raise the efficiency of the public good, however, it also helps to waste resources. It is shown that regional Leviathans not only under-provide the public good but also decrease the amount of wasteful expenditures as households become less mobile. Central government’s intervention can enhance efficiency if households are attached to particular regions. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Pure public goods; Leviathan; Household mobility; H70; H77. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43632 |
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