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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (7) Autor Beach, Robert H. (1) Gramig, Benjamin M. (1) Hennessy, David A. (1) Hillberg Seitzinger, Ann (1) Horan, Richard D. (1) Kobayashi, Mimako (1) Lubowski, Ruben N. (1) Mathews, Kenneth H., Jr. (1) Melkonyan, Tigran A. (1) Paarlberg, Philip L. (1) Pattanayak, Subhrendu K. (1) Poulos, Christine (1) Ranjan, Ram (1) Tisdell, Clement A. (1) Wang, Tong (1) Wolf, Christopher A. (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Livestock disease (7) Livestock Production/Industries (5) Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety (2) International Relations/Trade (2) Q12 (2) Q18 (2) Agribusiness (1) Agricultural household model (1) Asymmetric information (1) Avian influenza (1) C61 (1) California (1) Control measures (1) D82 (1) Economic epidemiology (1) Economics (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Incentives (1) Indemnities (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Journal Article (2) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Working Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2011 (1) 2010 (1) 2007 (1) 2006 (1) 2005 (1) 2004 (1) Mais... País United States (7) Idioma Inglês (7)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 7 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses AgEcon Kobayashi, Mimako; Melkonyan, Tigran A.. We model a game between two players taking biosecurity actions and characterize the Nash equilibria and their properties for the cases of strategic complements and substitutes. Implications of the theoretical model are investigated using data for biosecurity behavior among producers participating in a livestock exhibition. Biosecurity actions with own benefits and lasting impacts in home communities exhibit a positive relationship with behavior of the producers from geographically close areas. The number and probabilities of biosecurity actions taken by exhibitors are positively associated with the number of animals exhibited and they vary among commercial and hobby producers and across species/types of commercial production. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: California; Livestock disease; Livestock exhibition; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; Agribusiness. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117152 NATIONAL IMPACTS OF CHANGES IN LIVESTOCK DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AgEcon Hillberg Seitzinger, Ann; Paarlberg, Philip L.; Mathews, Kenneth H., Jr.. This research estimates the U.S. economic welfare effects of livestock disease surveillance. One type of surveillance considers livestock diseases already in the United States. Annual national economic welfare increases $1.4 billion on average compared with a Federal surveillance budget for endemic diseases of $300 million annually. Other surveillance deals with reducing the risk of foreign animal diseases entering and becoming established. The estimated annual gain to producers from surveillance for foreign animal diseases is $401 million dollars. Consumers experience additional benefits of $170 million annually. Total annual benefits are $571 million versus a foreign animal disease surveillance budget of $165 million. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Surveillance; Economics; International Relations/Trade; Livestock Production/Industries; Q10; Q17. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97837 Economics of Controlling Livestock Diseases: Basic Theory AgEcon Tisdell, Clement A.. Extends the simple model of the economics of controlling livestock disease as first presented by McInerney (1991) to take account of start-up costs which give use to thresholds effects. A further extension is given to allow for economics of such in disease control which can also have a threshold effect. The problem of uncertainty about the costs and benefits of disease control in livestock is also discussed. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Environmental Economics and Policy; Livestock Production/Industries. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55093 Agricultural Household Response to Avian Influenza Prevention and Control Policies AgEcon Beach, Robert H.; Poulos, Christine; Pattanayak, Subhrendu K.. Recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Asia, Europe, and Africa have caused severe impacts on the poultry sector through bird mortality and culling, as well as resulting trade restrictions and negative demand shocks. Although poultry producers play a major role in preventing and controlling avian influenza, little research has examined the influence of their farm-level decision making on the spread of the disease. In this study, we describe farm behavior under livestock disease risk and discuss data and analyses necessary to generate sound empirical evidence to inform public avian influenza prevention and control measures. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Agricultural household model; Avian influenza; Control measures; Economic epidemiology; Livestock disease; Poultry production; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; International Relations/Trade; Livestock Production/Industries; Q12; Q18. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6537 A Model of Producer Incentives for Livestock Disease Management AgEcon Ranjan, Ram; Lubowski, Ruben N.. We examine the management of livestock diseases from the producers' perspective, incorporating information and incentive asymmetries between producers and regulators. Using a dynamic model, we examine responses to different policy options including indemnity payments, subsidies to report at-risk animals, monitoring, and regulatory approaches to decreasing infection risks when perverse incentives and multiple policies interact. This conceptual analysis illustrates the importance of designing efficient combinations of regulatory and incentive-based policies. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Asymmetric information; Reporting; Indemnities; Risk management; Livestock Production/Industries; C61; D82; Q12; Q18; Q28. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15653 A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response AgEcon Gramig, Benjamin M.; Horan, Richard D.; Wolf, Christopher A.. This paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By incorporating the asymmetry, we investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and magnitude of a disease epidemic. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Moral hazard; Principal-agent model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19200 Modeling Interdependent Participation Incentives: Dynamics of a Voluntary Livestock Disease Control Program AgEcon Wang, Tong; Hennessy, David A.. This paper models producers’ interdependent incentives to participate in a voluntary livestock disease control program. Under strategic complementarity among participation decisions, after a slow start momentum can build such that market premium for participation and participation rate increase sequentially. Non-participation, partial participation and full participation can all be Nash equilibria while participation cost heterogeneity will dispose the outcome toward incomplete participation. We find plausible conditions under which temporary government subsidies to the least cost-effective producers causes tipping toward full participation. Applying parameters from the literature on Johnes’ disease, we illustrate factors that may affect participation.... Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Incentives; Livestock disease; Momentum theorem; Strategic complementarity; Tipping; Voluntary program.; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Livestock Production/Industries. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122358 Registros recuperados: 7 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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