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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (10) Autor Jotzo, Frank (2) Lopez, Rigoberto A. (2) Mazouz, Salim (2) Pezzey, John C.V. (2) Graham-Tomasi, Theodore (1) Hathie, Ibrahima (1) Kinsey, Jean D. (1) Levy, Philip I. (1) Magombo, Tennyson (1) Magreta, Ruth (1) Matschke, Xenia (1) Ndayisenga, Fidele (1) Roe, Terry L. (1) Serrao, Amilcar (1) Ursprung, Heinrich W. (1) Zingore, Shamie (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Lobbying (10) Political Economy (6) Political economy (4) Agricultural and Food Policy (3) Tariffs (3) Agribusiness (2) Australia (2) Carbon leakage (2) Climate policy (2) D72 (2) Emission trading (2) Environmental Economics and Policy (2) F13 (2) Farm policy (2) Food manufacturing (2) International Relations/Trade (2) Political contributions (2) Targets (2) Trade protection (2) Agribusiness firm (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (5) Conference Paper or Presentation (3) Journal Article (1) Report (1) Ano 2010 (2) 2009 (1) 2005 (1) 2003 (1) 2002 (3) 1999 (1) 1990 (1) Mais... País United States (10) Idioma Inglês (10)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 10 Primeira ... 1 ... Última The logic of collective action and Australia’s Climate Policy AgEcon Pezzey, John C.V.; Mazouz, Salim; Jotzo, Frank. The Australian Government's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), March 2009, set a target of 5 to 15 per cent emission cuts during 2000 and 2020. The proposed target is weak and is likely to increase mitigation costs in Australia in the long run. This research report analyses the target’s efficiency as well as provisions for preventing carbon leakage. The research also looks at the nature of changes to the CPRS made during 2008 as well as the likely cause of these changes. The free allocation of output-linked, tradable permits to Emissions-Intensive, Trade-Exposed (EITE) sectors was much higher than previously proposed and greater than what is needed to prevent carbon leakage. This means EITE emissions could rise by 13 per cent during 2010 and... Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Australia; Targets; Emission trading; Carbon leakage; Lobbying; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94824 When the Weak Win: Role of Farmer Groups in Influencing Agricultural Policy Outcome; a Case of Nkhate Irrigation Scheme in Malawi AgEcon Magreta, Ruth; Magombo, Tennyson; Zingore, Shamie. The knowledge today recaps that’s livelihood of many African farmers are constrained by poor access to both inputs and output markets, limited entrepreneurial skills for adding value to produce and to bargain for better prices and finally limited technical skills in agricultural production. Despite a tremendous attention to salvage this through government interventions and research, there is still a big problem in addressing the smallholder farmer’s needs. Farmer organizations open up opportunities for farmers to better overcome the above mentioned constraints through lobbying and collective action. Drawing from results of Participatory diagnosis and participatory market research done in Nkhate irrigation scheme in 2007 and 2008 this paper examines the... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Farmer groups; Profitability; Input and output markets; Participatory market research; Lobbying; Farm Management. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97043 Food Protection for Sale AgEcon Lopez, Rigoberto A.; Matschke, Xenia. This article tests the Protection for Sale (PFS) model using detailed data from U.S. food processing industries from 1978 to 1992 under alternative import demand specifications. All empirical results support the PFS model predictions and previous empirical work qualitatively. Although welfare weights are very sensitive to import demand specification, a surprising result is that we obtain weights between 2.6 and 3.6 for domestic welfare using import slopes or elasticities derived from domestic demand and supply functions. In contrast, results based on import slopes or elasticities from directly specified import demands (including the Armington model) yield the usual, unrealistically large estimates for the domestic welfare weight. We contend that the latter... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Trade protection; Tariffs; Lobbying; Political economy; Food manufacturing; Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy; F13; F1; L66; C12. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25195 Is Protection for Sale in U.S. Food Industries? AgEcon Lopez, Rigoberto A.; Hathie, Ibrahima. This article tests the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale model using panel data from U.S. food processing industries with endogenous protection, imports, and political organization of industries. The results support the key predictions of the model: organized industries are granted higher protection that decreases with import penetration and the price elasticity of imports, but in unorganized industries protection increases with import penetration. In spite of substantial differences in data sets and empirical procedures, the estimated weight on aggregate welfare is strikingly similar those found by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandopadhyay (2000), implying that protection is not for sale in these industries. Furthermore, the presence of... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Trade protection; Tariffs; Lobbying; Political economy; Food manufacturing; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25182 Lobbying and Political Polarization AgEcon Ursprung, Heinrich W.. Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political competition; Lobbying; Interest groups; Campaign contributions; Political Economy; D72. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26219 THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND AUSTRALIA'S CLIMATE POLICY AgEcon Pezzey, John C.V.; Mazouz, Salim; Jotzo, Frank. We thank two anonymous referees and the Department of Climate Change for helpful comments. This research was supported financially by the Environmental Economics Research Hub of the Australian Government's Commonwealth Environment Research Facilities program. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Australia; Targets; Emission trading; Carbon leakage; Lobbying; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59577 THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY FOOD MANUFACTURING FIRMS ON U.S. FARM POLICY AgEcon Kinsey, Jean D.; Ndayisenga, Fidele. This study generates an econometric model of the allocation of political contributions by food firms. It combines information about food firms' total expenditures for political influence with the behavioral assumption of profit maximization to test the hypothesis that food manufacturing firms do not lobby against farm policies. The results support the hypothesis. The inferences are conditional on the effects observed in the sample. The conclusions from this analysis may not be widely generalizable, but they do inform hypotheses about the intentions of food firms that participate in the political market. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Agricultural commodity programs; Farm policy; Food manufacturers; Lobbying; Political contributions; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agribusiness. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14678 Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of Political Economy Theories AgEcon Levy, Philip I.. This paper provides a rough test of a broad and prominent class of political economy of trade models and finds them wanting. The class features governments with weighted social welfare functions, including the prominent model of Grossman and Helpman. Whether the government is the single domestic player or there are other players involved (as with the lobbies in the Grossman-Helpman case) the government ultimately acts as a unitary player in international dealings. Recent work has shown that such unitary actors care exclusively about terms of trade in international negotiations. This paper pursues the implication that governments’ choice of trade instruments may offer a better test of the unitary government framework than existing empirical work. We use the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Trade policy; Lobbying; Tariffs; Political economy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; D72; F13. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28526 Influence of Political Campaign Contributions by American Agribusiness Firms on U.S. Farm Policy AgEcon Serrao, Amilcar. This study adapts Ndayisenga and Kinsey's econometric model of the allocation of political campaign contributions by agribusiness firms. This model combines information on campaign contributions for political influence with the behavior assumption of profit maximization to test the hypotheses that agribusiness firms do not lobby against farm policies. Model results support the hypotheses and show that lobbying expenditure in output markets is statistically significant, and that political campaign contributions to the Democratic Party significantly correlate with agribusiness firms' profits. The conclusions of this study provide useful information about the intentions of agribusiness firms that participate in the political market, but the results should be... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agribusiness firm; Farm policy; Lobbying; Political contributions; Political Economy. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24855 Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium AgEcon Roe, Terry L.; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore. A two sector general equilibrium model is developed in which households can influence the government's choice of the relative price of traded goods and the level of public goods supplied to each sector. The model is used to illustrate key problems addressed by the political economy literature, modeling issues that arise, and the nature of insights that can be obtained that traditional approaches cannot discern. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: General equilibrium; Political economy; Rent seeking; Lobbying; Political Economy. Ano: 1990 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7483 Registros recuperados: 10 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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