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| Stark, Oded; Behrens, Doris A.. |
| Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the "span of interaction." Trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma "rule of engagement." A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner’s dilemma games played with his m/2 neighbors to the left, and with his m/2 neighbors to the right. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son who adheres to his father’s span of interaction decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous member of the group comprising his father and his father’s m trading partners. Under a conventional structure of payoffs, it is shown that a large span of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Local interaction; Span of interaction; Imitation; Cooperation; Social welfare; Farm Management; D83; R12; O4. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94280 |
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