Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (10) Autor Yamaura, Koichi (2) Allender, William J. (1) Amorim, Airton Lopes (1) Braga, Marcelo Jose (1) Campos, Antonio Carvalho (1) Cason, Timothy N. (1) Coronel, Daniel Arruda (1) Devadoss, Stephen (1) Duke, Charlotte (1) Featherstone, Allen M. (1) Gangadharan, Lata (1) Koontz, Stephen R. (1) Luckstead, Jeff (1) MacDonald, James M. (1) Mittelhammer, Ronald C. (1) Monge, Juan J. (1) Richards, Timothy J. (1) Russo, Carlo (1) Wu, Steven Y. (1) Xia, Tian (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Market Power (10) Industrial Organization (7) International Relations/Trade (3) Agribusiness (2) C91 (2) L13 (2) Marketing (2) ASEAN (1) Agricultural and Food Policy (1) Apple Trade (1) Carbonated Soft Drinks (1) Competition (1) Conjectural Elasticity (1) Contracts (1) D02 (1) D43 (1) D86 (1) Decoupling (1) Deficiency Payments (1) Demand and Price Analysis (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (6) Presentation (2) Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2012 (2) 2011 (2) 2010 (3) 2009 (1) 2007 (1) 2003 (1) Mais... País United States (10) Idioma Inglês (9) Português (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 10 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Impacts of "Right of First Refusal" on Competitiveness of Fed Cattle Markets: Results from an Economic Experiment AgEcon Koontz, Stephen R.. Tipo: Presentation Palavras-chave: Right-of-First Refusal; Market Power; Fed Cattle Markets; Industrial Organization; Marketing. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123875 Market Power in the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry AgEcon Allender, William J.; Richards, Timothy J.. We investigate the strategic pricing for leading brands sold in the carbonated soft drink (CSD) market in the context of a flexible demand specification (i.e. random parameter nested logit) and a structural pricing equation. Our approach does not rely upon the often used ad hoc linear approximations to demand and profit-maximizing first-order conditions. We estimate the structural pricing equation using four different estimators (i.e. OLS, LIML, 2SLS, and GMM) and compare the implied deviation from Bertrand-Nash competition. Our results suggest that retailers, on average, price CSD brands below their cost, likely a result of the competitive retailing environment. We also find CSD wholesalers price their brands significantly more cooperatively than... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Market Power; Carbonated Soft Drinks; Econometrics; LIML; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/104222 Competition in Japanese Genetically Modified Soybean Import Market AgEcon Yamaura, Koichi; Xia, Tian. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Market Power; GM Soybean; Industrial Organization; International Relations/Trade. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61514 Measuring Market Power Exertion in the U.S. Ethanol Industry AgEcon Monge, Juan J.. The objective of this study is to investigate potential market power exertion in the output market of the ethanol-producing sector using the Solow Residual-Based (SRB) test and its different modalities (primal and primal-dual). The markup estimates (Lerner’s index) obtained using ethanol imports and processed crudel oil as instrumental variables to estimate the primal SRB are compared to the primal-dual SRB estimates. For both approaches, a statistically significant positive markup was estimated implying the presense of market power exertion. Both markup estimates are relatively close to each other. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Ethanol; Market Power; Lerner's index; Solow Residual; Industrial Organization; Productivity Analysis. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61364 Market Power in Tradable Emission Markets: A Laboratory Testbed for Emission Trading in Port Phillip Bay, Victoria AgEcon Cason, Timothy N.; Gangadharan, Lata; Duke, Charlotte. In theory, competitive emission permit markets minimise total abatement cost for any emission ceiling. Permit markets are often imperfectly competitive, however, if they are thin and dominated by large firms. The dominant firm(s) could exercise market power and increase other firms’ costs of pollution control, while reducing their own emission control costs. This paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment to examine whether a dominant firm can exercise market power in a permit market organised using the double auction trading institution. Our parameters approximate the abatement costs of sources in a proposed tradable emissions market for the reduction of nitrogen in the Port Phillip Watershed in Victoria, Australia. We vary across treatments the... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Market Power; Emission Permits; Experiments; Environmental Regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; C91; Q25; Q28. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57841 Poder de mercado das exportações de farelo de soja: uma análise via demanda residual AgEcon Coronel, Daniel Arruda; Amorim, Airton Lopes; Braga, Marcelo Jose; Campos, Antonio Carvalho. The objective of this paper was to verify the market power of the Argentinean, Brazilian and American exports of soymeal to the European Union, the main consumer market of this commodity. For that, the article is based on the methodology of residual demand. Using the methods Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS), the results indicated that, though this segment is concentrated by Argentina, Brazil and the United States, none of these countries presented market power for soymeal exports. In other words, they are not able to change soymeal prices without to decrease the exports Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Market Power; International Trade; Soymeal; Residual Demand; Industrial Organization; International Relations/Trade; F12; L13. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114462 Market Competition, Institutions, and Contracting Outcomes: Preliminary Model and Experimental Results AgEcon MacDonald, James M.; Wu, Steven Y.. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Contracts; Competition; Market Power; Enforcement; Institutions; Agribusiness; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Production Economics; C91; D02; D43; D86. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50625 Chinese and U.S. Apple Trade in ASEAN AgEcon Luckstead, Jeff; Devadoss, Stephen; Mittelhammer, Ronald C.. We investigate oligopolistic competition between U.S. and Chinese apple exporters in the ASEAN market using strategic trade theory and the NEIO literature. We also analyze competition in the U.S. and Chinese domestic markets. U.S. supplies higher quality apples to ASEAN than China, resulting in product differentiation. The results show that U.S. exporters had a higher markup than Chinese exporters through the 1990s; however, as the share of Chinese apples expanded, the U.S. markup declined and the Chinese markup increased dramatically. Competitive pricing prevails both in the U.S. and Chinese domestic markets. Tipo: Presentation Palavras-chave: Apple Trade; Market Power; ASEAN; Conjectural Elasticity; Industrial Organization; International Relations/Trade; F13; L1. Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124372 How Market Power Changes in Monopoly: Using Lau’s Hessian Identities AgEcon Yamaura, Koichi; Featherstone, Allen M.. This research examines market power using Lau’s Hessian Identity relationships based on the empirical properties of duality theory. We compare the performance of the proposed dual approach using Lau’s Hessian Identity relationships with the simple traditional dual approach. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Lau’s Hessian Identity; Monte Carlo simulation; Market Power; Monopoly; Marketing. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103932 Deficiency Payments and Market Power: Effects of Imperfect Competition on Welfare Distribution and Decoupling AgEcon Russo, Carlo. Despite the increasing importance of market power in the food industry, most policy models assume perfect competition. Ignoring market power may lead economists to make incorrect, or at least misleading, policy recommendations. In this paper I develop a theoretical model in which market power can alter conclusions regarding the welfare effects of a specific policy change: replacing deficiency payments with decoupled payments to farmers, and apply it to the U.S. wheat market and milling industry. The main conclusions of the theoretical model are that, middlemen’s market power may cause i) an increase in public expenditure, ii) an extraction of policy rents from the taxpayers by the middlemen, and iii) a reduction of the social benefit from decoupling... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Decoupling; Deficiency Payments; Market Power; Financial Economics; Q18; L13. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9767 Registros recuperados: 10 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco