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| Glebe, Thilo W.. |
| This article deals with the optimal differentiation of agri-environmental contracts based on a self-selection mechanism. The paper demonstrates that both economic efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditures can be increased, if a menu of combinations of farming practices and payments are offered. However, there is a trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness, since the optimal programme minimising government expenses does not simultaneously minimise farmers’ opportunity costs. A numerical example of differentiated agri-environmental contracts, aiming for the reduction of nitrogen fertiliser in wheat production, illustrates that efficiency and effectiveness gains can be substantial. Furthermore, it is shown that economic rents for agricultural... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agri-environmental policy; Efficiency; Adverse selection; Mechanism design; Self-selection; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97185 |
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| Coram, Alex. |
| This paper uses a control theory approach to analyse the collectively optimal rate of extraction along a river system and constructs a bidding mechanism that would produce the required prices at each point. It also analyses some characteristics of this mechanism. This approach brings some new perspective to existing work on externalities. It also helps bring to light some aspects of the system as a whole that may be less obvious in a more piecemeal analysis, including the fact that there may not be an optimal solution to the allocation problem. Although the bidding mechanism may be difficult to implement, it may be possible to design various forms of hybrid schemes that have practical value. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Control theory; Mechanism design; Optimal allocation; Rights markets; Waters; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116974 |
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