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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (9) Autor Shaik, Saleem (2) Atwood, Joseph A. (1) Bartolini, Fabio (1) Clark, J. Stephen (1) Cooley, Thomas (1) Di Giannatale, Sonia (1) Dubois, Pierre (1) Fraser, Rob W. (1) Gallerani, Vittorio (1) Gian Luca, Clementi (1) Giudicissi, Eufrasia (1) Nakajima, Shinsaku (1) Raggi, Meri (1) Stefani, Gianluca (1) Tahara, Kengo (1) Thibodeau, David R. (1) Viaggi, Davide (1) Vukina, Tomislav (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Moral Hazard (9) D82 (4) Agricultural and Food Policy (3) Q15 (3) Adverse Selection (2) Crop Insurance (2) D86 (2) Land Economics/Use (2) Optional Unit Policy (2) Q10 (2) Q18 (2) Q58 (2) Risk and Uncertainty (2) U.S. Cotton (2) Agency Contracts (1) Agri-Environmental Policy (1) Agri-Environmental Schemes (1) Agri-environmental schemes (1) Agribusiness (1) Agricultural Collectives (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (7) Report (1) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2011 (2) 2010 (1) 2009 (3) 2008 (1) 2006 (1) 2002 (1) Mais... País United States (9) Idioma Inglês (9)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 9 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data AgEcon Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav. The objective of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for estimation of the parameters of a structural model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking into account agents heterogeneity in preferences. We show that allowing the principal to strategically distribute the production inputs across heterogenous agents as part of the contract design, the principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract into individualized contracts tailored to fit agents' preferences or characteristics. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we find that contracting farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agency Contracts; Optimal Incentives; Moral Hazard; Risk Aversion; Heterogeneity; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25568 Cross Compliance: what about compliance? AgEcon Stefani, Gianluca; Giudicissi, Eufrasia. We reviewed some moral hazard (MH) models applied to agri-environmental policies and identified the main methodological aspects of the literature on this topics. Imperfect vs incomplete monitoring , static vs dynamic and single vs multiple agents models are the main lines along which the literature has been organised analysing each component of a MH model. Most papers point out the role of farmers' risk aversion in mitigating MH. Others highlight that the observed high rate of compliance is still somewhat paradoxical given current enforcement strategies with low fines and monitoring levels. Cross compliance confirm these findings and urges further studies on dynamic models and farmers' non profit maximising behaviour. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Cross-compliance; Moral Hazard; Enforcement; Agri-environmental schemes; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q15; Q58; D82. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99597 A Theory of Firm Decline AgEcon Gian Luca, Clementi; Cooley, Thomas; Di Giannatale, Sonia. We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter keeps on growing, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Principal Agent; Moral Hazard; Hidden Action; Incentives; Survival; Firm Dynamics; Financial Economics; D82; D86; D92; G32. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92788 LINKING CROSS-COMPLIANCE AND AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL SCHEMES: A CASE STUDY IN EMILIA ROMAGNA AgEcon Bartolini, Fabio; Gallerani, Vittorio; Raggi, Meri; Viaggi, Davide. Agri-environmental schemes (AES) have been studied under different perspectives in Europe, since the beginning of the ‘90s. Under regulation 1698/2005, agri-environmental schemes design has been modified with a more clear identification of a baseline for identifying the commitments and the costs of these prescriptions. The link between cross-compliance and agri-environmental schemes can be interpreted as a problem of joint design by the decision maker. From the farmer’s point of view, private costs of participations in agri-environmental schemes shall be added to the cost to be compliant with the mandatory standard defined for each measure if they are not already implemented. This amount of costs arise when mandatory standard are required in the whole... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agri-Environmental Schemes; Cross Compliance; Farmers’ Behaviour Modelling; Moral Hazard; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Q10; Q18. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44800 Government support, transfer efficiency, and moral hazard within heterogeneous regions in Canadian Agriculture AgEcon Thibodeau, David R.; Clark, J. Stephen. This study estimates the transfer efficiency of government payments on Canadian agriculture. Three measures of efficiency are used: (1) the capitalization of support into farmland values, (2) the rate of income stabilization, and (3) the effect of past government support on the variance of income. We derive transfer efficiency estimates by applying panel econometric techniques to provincial time series data. With regard to the capitalization formula, we find that the capitalization of government into farmland values is homogeneous across provinces. We estimate the rate of capitalization at approximately $11.76 for every $1.00 increase in government support. A substantial amount of heterogeneity was found for the stabilization equation. Four homogeneous... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Land values; Income stabilization; Moral Hazard; Non-stationarity; Agricultural and Food Policy; Land Economics/Use; Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51806 OPTIONAL UNIT POLICY IN CROP INSURANCE AgEcon Shaik, Saleem; Atwood, Joseph A.. Utilizing ordered logit we examine the presence of two kinds of asymmetric information-adverse selection (intertemporal variability) and moral hazard (interspatial and/or residual variability) as revealed by the choice of optional units in Federal crop insurance utilizing Risk Management Agency's 1996-2000 cotton yield and loss data files. Further, a tobit model is estimated to examine the factors explaining the loss cost ratio from Risk Management Agency perspective. Potential costs of adverse selection and/or moral hazard in optional unit provision are estimated to be as high as $180 million in US cotton over the 1996-2000 period. Keywords: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Optional Unit Policy, Crop Insurance, U.S. Cotton, Logit and Tobit models. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Optional Unit Policy; Crop Insurance; U.S. Cotton; Logit and Tobit models.; Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19741 The Choice of Participation Forms in Community-Based Group Farming and Efficiency in Team Production AgEcon Nakajima, Shinsaku; Tahara, Kengo. Past studies suggest that family farming is more productive than farming groups, but empirical studies are not enough to conclude which is more efficient. This paper tries to econometrically analyze the efficiency difference between farming groups and family farming, using original plot yield data from a district in Japan. We accomplish this by, first, analyzing the empirical determinants behind the farmers’ choice of participation forms in farming groups based on communities. Second, we verify the presence of free-riding at community-based farming groups which adopts an income-pooling system. Results of the regression analysis showed that for the choice of participation forms in farming groups the most important factor is family labor force. Estimating... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural Collectives; Tenancy Contract; Moral Hazard; Farm Management; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; D23; D86; Q15. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51640 Moral Hazard, Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri-Environmental Policy AgEcon Fraser, Rob W.. This paper extends the multi-period agri-environmental contract model of Fraser (2004) so that it contains a more realistic specification of the inter-temporal penalties for non-compliance, and therefore of the inter-temporal moral hazard problem in agri-environmental policy design. On this basis it is shown that a farmer will have an unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period based on differences in the expected cost of compliance. It is then shown how the principal can make use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring resources intertemporally, and in so doing, to encourage full contract duration compliance. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Moral Hazard; Contract Duration; Agri-Environmental Policy; Targeting; Agribusiness; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q15; Q18; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108795 Role of Panel Analysis in Identifying Asymmetric Information with Optional Unit Provision in Federal Crop Insurance AgEcon Shaik, Saleem. This paper has a two-fold contribution, first we demonstrate the relationship of spatial, temporal and residual yield risk estimated from a two-way panel random effects model to asymmetric information with an optional unit provision in the federal crop insurance program. Second, the yield risk components are incorporated in a discrete choice model to examine the presence of asymmetric information due to potential yield switching with optional unit provisions. Empirical application to 1998 U.S. cotton crop insurance data reveals the presence of asymmetric information with optional unit provisions. Tipo: Report Palavras-chave: Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Optional Unit Policy; Crop Insurance; U.S. Cotton; Crop Production/Industries; Demand and Price Analysis; D82; G22; Q10. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54983 Registros recuperados: 9 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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