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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Hennessy, David A. (1) Jensen, Helen H. (1) Nante, Nicola (1) Orsini, Nicola (1) Patterson, Paul M. (1) Richards, Timothy J. (1) Rizzuto, Debora (1) Roosen, Jutta (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Nash equilibrium (3) Game theory (2) Demand and Price Analysis (1) Dynamics (1) Feeder trade (1) Game tree (1) Industrialization (1) Information (1) Livestock Production/Industries (1) Payoff matrix (1) Perishables (1) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (1) Supermarkets (1) Tacit collusion (1) Trigger prices. (1) Vertical integration (1) Welfare (1) Zero-sum game (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Journal Article (1) Ano 2005 (1) 2004 (2) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Sales Promotion and Cooperative Retail Pricing Strategies AgEcon Richards, Timothy J.; Patterson, Paul M.. Supermarket retailers make strategic pricing decisions in a high-frequency, repeated game environment both in buying and selling fresh produce. In this context, there is some question as to whether a non-cooperative equilibrium can emerge that produces margins above the competitive level. Supermarket pricing results from tacitly collusive equilibria supported by trigger price strategies played in upstream markets. Upstream activities are, in turn, driven by periodic retail price promotions. We test this hypothesis using a sample of fresh produce pricing data from 20 supermarket chains in markets distributed throughout the U.S. Our results support the existence of tacitly collusive non-cooperative equilibria in upstream and downstream markets. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Dynamics; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Perishables; Supermarkets; Tacit collusion; Trigger prices.; Demand and Price Analysis. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28542 INFECTIOUS DISEASE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND SCALE IN OPEN AND CLOSED ANIMAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS AgEcon Hennessy, David A.; Roosen, Jutta; Jensen, Helen H.. Comparative advantage motivates large trade flows in feeder animals throughout the world. Trade creates externalities when animal diseases can spread beyond the purchasing farm. When growers can choose between open and closed production systems, Nash equilibrium will likely involve socially excessive trading. Supply response to an increase in marginal costs may be positive. While first-best involves marketwide adoption of either an open-trade or closed-farm system, equilibrium may entail heterogeneous systems. If this is the case, then the feeder trade should be banned. Within a farm, we show how risk of infectious disease can create decreasing returns to scale when the technology is otherwise increasing in returns to scale. Control of disease risk... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Feeder trade; Industrialization; Information; Nash equilibrium; Vertical integration; Welfare; Livestock Production/Industries. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18405 Introduction to game-theory calculations AgEcon Orsini, Nicola; Rizzuto, Debora; Nante, Nicola. Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent and rational decision makers (Myerson 1991). Game-theory concepts apply in economy, sociology, biology, and health care, and whenever the actions of several agents (individuals, groups, or any combination of these) are interdependent. We present a new command gamet to represent the extensive form (game tree) and the strategic form (payoff matrix) of a noncooperative game and to identify the solution of a nonzero and zero-sum game through dominant and dominated strategies, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and Nash equilibrium in pure and fully mixed strategies. Further, gamet can identify the solution of a zero-sum game through maximin... Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Payoff matrix; Zero-sum game; Game tree; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/117525 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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