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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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| Burmeister, Larry; Ranis, Gustav; Wang, Michael. |
| This study presents a comparative analysis of farmers organisations in Korea and Taiwan during 1950-80 in order to help us understand the role of group behavior in affecting development outcomes. It highlights the linkages between group behavior, parastatal organisational structures and economic performance. The paper examines the historical and political economy contexts that led to the creation of both countries farmers organisations and highlights the institutional characteristics that impacted their operational effectiveness. The study discusses elements in internal and external policies that affected group motivation and traces the implications of such differences in group behavior for bottom line performance. Though there existed many similarities... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Farmers organizations; Korea; Taiwan; Group behavior; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; O17. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28464 |
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| Giugale, Marcelo M.; El-Diwany, Sherif. |
| The paper shows how, when the enforceability of regulations is size-sensitive, price competition can lock firms into informality and, thus, smallness, depending on the form of the production function. In that context, exogenours "help"packages targeted to informal firms "promote" micro and small enterprises (i.e., increase their numbers) but do not "develop" them (i.e., foster their growth). The "help" only generates a short-term span of abnormal profits for existing informal firms, and a long-term income transfer toward informal-market consumers. The model is tested in the context of Egypt's micro and small enterprise sector. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Informality; Size Regulation; Egypt; Hide-Outs; Agricultural and Food Policy; O17; L11; L51. |
| Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18542 |
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| Tollens, Eric. |
| The paper deals with the emergence and rise of market information systems in sub-Sahara Africa as a result of economic liberalization. There has already been an evolution is such systems and no particular system dominates. Various types of market information systems exist today, public or private, all or not linked to a commodity exchange. The rationale of a commodity exchange is discussed, linked to a market information system. They all struggle with problems of sustainable financing. Very few if any good impact studies exist on such systems, demonstrating their effects on market transparency, information asymmetry, the bargaining power of poor farmers and their market access. Dissemination of the information, using traditional (radio) or modern (ICT)... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Marketing; Q13; Q18; O13; O17; H41. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25590 |
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| Madestam, Andreas. |
| I study the coexistence of formal and informal finance in underdeveloped credit markets. While weak institutions constrain formal banks, shallow pockets hamper informal lenders. In such economies, informal finance has two effects. By increasing the investment return it decreases borrowers’ relative payoff following default, inducing banks to lend more liberally (disciplinary effect). By channeling bank capital it reduces banks’ agency costs from lending directly to borrowers, limiting banks’ extension of borrower credit (rent-extraction effect). Among other things, the model shows that informal interest rates are higher, borrower welfare lower, and informal finance more prevalent when the rent-extraction effect prevails, consistent with stylized facts in... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Credit Markets; Financial Development; Institutions; Market Structure; Financial Economics; O12; O16; O17; D40. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54288 |
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| Ranis, Gustav. |
| The labor surplus economy model has as its basic premise the inability of unskilled agricultural labor markets to clear in countries with high man/land ratios. In such situations, the marginal product of labor is likely to fall below a bargaining wage, related to the average rather than the marginal product. The reallocation of such disguisedly unemployed workers by means of balanced intersectoral growth ultimately permits the entire economy to operate on neo-classical principles. Finally, the paper introduces open economy dimensions, indicates the existence of other labor surplus sub-sectors and briefly responds to neo-classical critiques on both theoretical and empirical grounds. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Development theory; Labor markets; Labor and Human Capital; O10; O12; O17. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28480 |
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| Blackman, Allen; Bannister, Geoffrey J.. |
| The considerable difficulties associated with cross-border environmental management are compounded when polluters are unlicensed micro-enterprises such as auto repair shops and traditional brick kilns; such "informal sector" firms are virtually impossible to regulate in the conventional manner. This paper describes an example of an innovative and promising approach to the problem: the Cd. Juarez Brickmakers' Project, a private-sector-led, binational initiative aimed at abating highly polluting emissions from Cd. Juarez's approximately 350 informal brick kilns. We draw three lessons from the Project's history. First, private-sector-led cross-border initiatives can work -- indeed they may be more effective than public sector initiatives -- but they require... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: US-Mexican border; Informal sector; Environment; Brickmaking; Environmental Economics and Policy; O17; O54; L61; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10600 |
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| Ligon, Ethan; Schechter, Laura. |
| What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed `real-world' gift-giving, while... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development; Political Economy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C92; C93; D03; D64; D85; O17. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120376 |
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| Dorward, Andrew; Kydd, Jonathan; Poulton, Colin. |
| This paper argues that the disappointing outcomes of adjustment policies in poor rural economies, principally in sub-Saharan Africa, can be partly attributed to weaknesses in the neo-classical theory which underlies these polices and from associated failures to recognise structural changes (or transitions) in growing agricultural economies. After a brief description of agricultural policy changes in sub Saharan Africa, the mixed achievements of market liberalisation policies are explained using new institutional economic arguments regarding inherent difficulties in economic coordination in poor economies, difficulties which markets themselves cannot overcome. A novel framework is put forward for understanding coordination failure and integrating it with... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Development; Coordination; Markets; Institutions; Marketing; O12; O17; Q12. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9535 |
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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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