|
|
|
|
|
| Fischer, Carolyn. |
| Environmental policies with output-based refunding of the revenues effectively combine a tax on emissions with a subsidy to output. Three similar forms exist: tradable performance standards, an emissions tax with rebates, and tradable permits with output-based allocation. Two arguments for including an output subsidy are imperfect competition, in which an environmental regulation alone could exacerbate output underprovision, and imperfect participation, in which imposing a regulation on a subset of polluters could cause output to shift to exempt firms. However, both these scenarios imply that output shares among program participants are likely to be significant. In this situation, output-allocated permits offer less of a subsidy than a fixed rebate, and... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emission tax; Permit allocation; Earmarking; Tradable performance standards; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H21; H23; Q2. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10764 |
| |
|
|
| Fischer, Carolyn. |
| Rate-based emissions policies (like tradable performance standards) fix average emissions intensity, while cap-and-trade policies fix total emissions. This paper shows that unfettered trade between rate-based and cap-and-trade programs always raises combined emissions, except when product markets are related in particular ways. Gains from trade are fully passed on to consumers in the rate-based sector, resulting in more output and greater emissions allocations. We consider a range of policy options to offset the expansion, including unilateral ones when jurisdictional differences require. The cap-and-trade jurisdiction could impose an "exchange rate" to adjust for relative permit values, but marginal abatement cost equalization is sacrificed. Still, that... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emissions trading; Permit allocation; Tradable performance standards; Climate; Greenhouse gases; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; H3; Q2; Q48. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10713 |
| |
|
|
| Fischer, Carolyn. |
| Political pressure often exists to earmark environmental tax revenues or permit rents to the industry affected by the regulation. This paper analyzes schemes that rebate revenues based on output shares: tradable performance standards, an emissions tax with market-share rebates, and tradable permits with output-based allocation. All three policies effectively combine a tax on emissions with a subsidy to output. The result is a shifting of emissions control efforts toward greater emissions rate reduction and less output contraction, with higher marginal costs of control and lower output prices compared to the social optimum, given any targeted level of abatement. These welfare costs depend on the degree of output substitutability and are likely to be much... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emission tax; Permit allocation; Earmarking; Tradable performance standards; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; H23; Q2. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10709 |
| |
|
|
|
