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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Feng, Hongli (1) Murphy, James J. (1) Parry, Ian W.H. (1) Spraggon, John M. (1) Stranlund, John K. (1) Toman, Michael (1) Zhao, Jinhua (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Permit banking (3) Bankable permits (1) Borrowing (1) C91 (1) Cap-and-trade (1) Carbon emissions (1) Compliance (1) Early reduction credits (1) Emissions trading (1) Enforcement (1) H23 (1) L51 (1) Laboratory experiments (1) Permit markets (1) Public Economics (1) Q28 (1) Q48 (1) Q58 (1) Welfare impacts (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Ano 2010 (1) 2002 (1) 2000 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última ALTERNATIVE INTERTEMPROAL PERMIT TRADING REGIMES WITH STOCHASTIC ABATEMENT COSTS AgEcon Feng, Hongli; Zhao, Jinhua. We examine the social efficiency of alternative intertemporal permit trading regimes. Banking with a 1-to-1 ratio and with a non-unitary intertemporal trading ratio (ITR) are compared with each other and with the no-banking permit trading regime. The more industry-wide shocks vary, and/or the more they are negatively correlated across time, the more efficient is a bankable permit regime. When the slope of the benefit function is greater than the slope of the damage function, banking with ITR=1+r is more efficient than a no-banking regime. Banking with ITR=1 can be more efficient than a no-banking regime. However, whether ITR=1 or ITR=1+r is better depends on the covariance structure of the shocks and the benefit and damage functions. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Bankable permits; Permit banking; Borrowing; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18543 An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Murphy, James J.; Spraggon, John M.. Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions trading; Laboratory experiments; Permit markets; Permit banking; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; C91; L51; Q58. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93966 Early Emissions Reduction Programs: An Application to CO2 Policy AgEcon Parry, Ian W.H.; Toman, Michael. In the wake of the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which, if implemented, would oblige the United States and other industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 2008-2012, a number of proposals have been offered to increase the incentives for reducing emissions over the nearer term. The existence of an interim period between setting and implementing environmental goals is ubiquitous in environmental policymaking. The existence of this interim period gives rise to several potential rationales for early emissions reductions. In this paper we use a series of simple models and numerical illustrations to analyze some aspects of the performance of early emissions reduction programs in the case of GHGs. We show that there is a compelling economic... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Early reduction credits; Carbon emissions; Welfare impacts; Permit banking; Cap-and-trade; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; H23; Q48. Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10791 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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