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| Burtraw, Dallas. |
| This paper reports on four areas of research concerning Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that regulates emissions of SO2 from electricity generation. The first is the costs of the program over the long-run as estimated from the current perspective taking into account recent changes in fuel markets and technology. We compare projected costs with potential cost savings that can be attributable to formal trading of emission allowances. The second area is an evaluation of how well allowance trading has worked to date. The third area is the relationship between compliance costs and economic costs from a general equilibrium perspective. The fourth area is a comparison of benefits and costs for the program. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Acid rain; Benefit-cost analysis; Air pollution; Permit trading; Clean Air Act; Environmental Economics and Policy; H43; Q2; Q4. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10885 |
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| O'Sullivan, Dan. |
| Using transferable water permits has been identified by economists as a necessary tool to efficiently allocate water to its highest valued use. Australian governments have seized the concept and begun to provide mechanisms that separate rights to water from land ownership and allow flexibility to trade the rights. Water trading is slowly taking shape but has been challenged regarding ownership rights and technical applications. Several key studies and projects are now testing a similar process to be used to develop ownership and incentives for diffuse water pollution. This paper analyses how rights to water quantity and water quality are emerging, the policy tools being used, and current challenges for decision makers. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Water property rights; Pollution; Permit trading; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31960 |
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| Rabotyagov, Sergey S.; Feng, Hongli; Kling, Catherine L.. |
| The optimal pollution permit trading system is examined when the regulator, faced with incomplete information on firms' abatement costs and delivery coefficients, seeks to minimize expected total abatement costs to meet an ex ante pollution target. Intuitively, we find that the optimal trading ratio and permit cap are set such that there will be more pollution when abatement costs are high and less pollution when abatement costs are low. Surprisingly however , even when the delivery coefficients are known with certainty, the optimal trading ratio will not necessarily equal the delivery coefficient, nor will it be optimal for the total permit quantity to equal the given pollution target. Instead, the trading ratio will tend to be larger when there is... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Delivery coefficient; Ex ante pollution target; Ex post pollution target; Permit trading; Total permit cap; Trading ratio; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21312 |
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