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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (4) Autor Dahl, Bruce L. (3) Wilson, William W. (3) Maxwell, Brett J. (2) Pandey, Vivek (1) Ross, Brent (1) Shanoyan, Aleksan (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Principal-Agent (4) Wheat (3) Crop Production/Industries (2) Functional Characteristic (2) Incentive Contact (2) Agribusiness (1) Asymmetric Information (1) Cellulosic Ethanol (1) Contracting (1) D82 (1) D86 (1) European Union (1) Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety (1) Genetically Modified (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) L23 (1) L24 (1) Michigan (1) Multiple agents (1) Q42 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Ano 2010 (1) 2006 (1) 2004 (2) País United States (4) Idioma Inglês (4)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última INCENTIVE CONTRACTS TO MEET FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN WHEAT PURCHASING -- SUMMARY AgEcon Wilson, William W.; Maxwell, Brett J.; Dahl, Bruce L.. Consistency of functional characteristics in hard red spring (HRS) wheat is a concern confronting sellers and buyers. This research analyzes contract incentives for importers with respect to cost and potential risk of acceptance. A principal-agent framework is utilized to examine contract incentives. In the principal-agent contract, the principal offers the contract, the agent rejects or accepts the contract, and then decides how much effort to apply. All this is subject to risk for the agent and moral hazard for the principal. An example is presented, for which equilibrium contract terms are a base price of 454 cents per bushel for low quality wheat and a premium of 36 cents per bushel if high quality is achieved. The premium for high quality is... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentive Contact; Functional Characteristic; Wheat; Principal-Agent; Crop Production/Industries. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23559 CONTRACTING STRATEGIES FOR EU TRACEABILITY REQUIREMENTS AgEcon Wilson, William W.; Dahl, Bruce L.. A principal-agent problem was specified to define the equilibrium solution of a contracting strategy for a U.S. supplier exporting wheat to meet EU traceability requirements. The buyer (principal) offers a contract, the supplier (agent) accepts the contract, and then the supplier decides whether to offer a contract to the farmer. Nature at each level of the supply chain represents uncertainty due to adventitious commingling and imperfect information. Results indicate farmers would require 9 c/bu and suppliers 8 c/bu to induce their participation in the contracting strategy. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Traceability; Principal-Agent; Contracting; Genetically Modified; Wheat; European Union; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23535 Governance Issues in the Principal-Agent Framework: Producing Cellulosic Ethanol in Michigan AgEcon Pandey, Vivek; Shanoyan, Aleksan; Ross, Brent. This article analyzes the incentives and compensation problems faced by cellulosic ethanol producer and logging firms and the consequent impact on the organization of the wood based cellulosic ethanol industry in the US. The success of this relationship is central to setting up the biofuel industry in Michigan and in the US at large. The theoretical results indicate that specification contract under the principal-agent framework is of limited utility due to’ metering’ problem when the principal contracts with multiple agents for the supply of feedstock.. Alternative arrangements including JVs have the potential to provide close to first best solutions. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Principal-Agent; Cellulosic Ethanol; Michigan; Multiple agents; Asymmetric Information; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D82; D86; L23; L24; Q42. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61362 INCENTIVE CONTRACTS TO MEET FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN WHEAT PURCHASING AgEcon Wilson, William W.; Maxwell, Brett J.; Dahl, Bruce L.. Consistency of functional characteristics in hard red spring (HRS) wheat is a concern confronting sellers and buyers. This research analyzes contract incentives for importers with respect to cost and potential risk of acceptance. A principal-agent framework is utilized to examine contract incentives. In the principal-agent contract, the principal offers the contract, the agent rejects or accepts the contract, and then decides how much effort to apply. All this is subject to risk for the agent and moral hazard for the principal. An example is presented, for which equilibrium contract terms are a base price of 454 cents per bushel for low quality wheat and a premium of 36 cents per bushel if high quality is achieved. The premium for high quality is... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentive Contact; Functional Characteristic; Wheat; Principal-Agent; Crop Production/Industries. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23617 Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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