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Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis AgEcon
Messer, Kent D.; Schmit, Todd M.; Kaiser, Harry M..
Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated hat could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggests that producer referendum play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is maximized by a Provision Point Mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the level of advertising effectiveness.
Tipo: Technical Report Palavras-chave: Generic commodity advertising; Experimental economics; Producer referendum; Provision point mechanism; Marketing.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122106
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Designing a Voluntary Beef Checkoff AgEcon
Norwood, F. Bailey; Winn, Chris; Chung, Chanjin; Ward, Clement E..
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the mandatory fees imposed by the beef checkoff violates the First Amendment. As a precaution, many states began forming voluntary beef checkoffs, where funds would be raised through voluntary contributions. This study conducted a survey of Oklahoma cattle producers to determine what type ofvoluntary checkoff design would receive the greatest support. The most popular checkoff placed a large emphasis on advertising and a slightly lower checkoff fee. The survey also tested the ability of a provision point mechanism to limit free-riding. The mechanism was not as effective as in other studies which used laboratory experiments.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Beef marketing; Checkoff; Free-rider; Provision point mechanism; Public good; Agricultural and Food Policy; Livestock Production/Industries.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10149
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The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation AgEcon
Groothuis, Peter A.; Whitehead, John C..
The provision point mechanism mitigates free-riding behavior in economic experiments. In two contingent valuation method surveys, we implement the provision point design. We ask respondents for their perceptions about the success of the provision point mechanism. We find that respondents who believe that the provision point would not be met are more likely to say no to a contingent valuation dichotomous choice question. The scenario rejection that arises may result in biased willingness-to-pay estimates.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Provision point mechanism; Contingent valuation; Willingness to pay; Public goods; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55542
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