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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Demand-side management programs comprise subsidies from franchised electric utilities for the purchase of high-efficiency appliances; e.g., air conditioners. Competition in power generation threatens the viability of these programs. However, it should also reduce the warrant for them. Under regulation, the justification for such programs depends, somewhat paradoxically, on below marginal-cost pricing. Eliminating regulation should permit pricing flexibility to discourage excessive on-peak energy use. It should also eliminate the assurance of returns that may have encouraged overbuilding of generation capacity. Entrants and incumbent utilities should find it easier to offer "energy services," i.e., to bundle electricity with appliances, if consumers are too... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Energy conservation; Regulatory policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L51; L94; Q48. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10615 |
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| Bell, Ruth Greenspan. |
| Several experiences in international environmental cooperation and assistance are examined to understand how communication across differing traditions, legal systems, cultures, history, and language has impacted joint efforts to develop stronger environmental regimes. The article concludes that efforts to build more effective environmental protection regimes in support of both domestic and international environmental goals must become much smarter to overcome communication barriers and related impediments to effective joint activities. Different traditions can coexist and even work productively together where there is strong and equal motivation on both sides. But when these conditions are absent, the international partners need to find additional bridging... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Regulatory policy; Regulatory design; Sustainable development; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10575 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Lower prices for polluting goods will increase their sales and the pollution that results from their production or use. Conventional intuition suggests that this relationship implies a greater need for environmental policy when prices of "dirty" goods fall. But the economic inefficiency resulting overproduction of polluting goods may fall, not rise, as the cost of producing those goods falls. While lower costs exacerbate overproduction, they also reduce the difference between private benefit and the total social cost--the sum of private and external costs--associated with that overproduction. We derive a test, based on readily observed or estimated parameters for conditions in which the latter effect outweighs the former. In such cases, making a dirty good... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environment; Regulatory policy; Externalities; Electricity restructuring; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; L51; L94. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10776 |
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| Calcott, Paul; Walls, Margaret. |
| Several studies have shown the efficiency of both a Pigovian tax on waste disposal and a deposit-refund instrument, that is a combined output tax and recycling subsidy. The efficiency of these instruments, however, critically depends on households being paid for recycling. In reality, although most households have access to curbside recycling services, they are not paid for the items they set out at the curb. All items placed in a recycling bin are thus of equal value to a household, and there is no incentive for producers to make their products any more recyclable than what is necessary to be eligible for the bin. This paper characterizes the constrained (second-best) optimum that exists with the missing recycling market and solves for a modified... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Solid waste; Regulatory policy; Regulatory design; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; Q28. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10567 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Jurisdictions have overlapping authority regarding electricity restructuring when a national authority and subnational regional governments-for example, states-both have a say. The initial sections of the paper review the division of regulatory authority over electricity markets in the United States, constitutional provisions, recent developments, and how federalist concerns have been manifested in antitrust and telecommunications. Justifications for using private markets rather than central governments suggest an efficiency approach to dividing authority, based on information, cross-border externalities, and agency, that is, the ability of a government to reflect the political preferences of its constituents. The goal is not to impose a "right" policy... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Federalism; Regulatory policy; Political Economy; H11; L94; L51; H77. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10802 |
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