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Zhang, Xiaobo; Tan, Kong-Yam. |
A key objective of China's reform program was to reduce distortions in the economic system and enhance growth. However, when implemented in incremental and partial ways, local governments or individuals have chance to capture rents inherent in the reform process. Young (2000) warned that the rent-seeking behavior might lead to increasing market fragmentation. Empirical studies have since shown that this did not happen in the product markets. In this paper we argue that as rents from the product markets were squeezed out during the reform process, rent-seeking behavior shifted to the factor markets, especially the capital and land markets. The reform process now needs to be deepened to ensure that the factor markets also become more integrated and efficient. |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Reform; China; Rent Seeking; Factor and Product Market; Transition; International Development; D33; D61; D63; O11; O53; P23. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60183 |
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Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Naghavi, Alireza. |
Are natural resources a source of conflict or stability? Empirical studies demonstrate that rents from natural resources, and in particular oil, are an important source of civil war. Allegedly, resource rents attract rent seekers, which destabilize society. However, there is a large literature on how so-called rentier states manage to pacify opposition groups by handing out special favors. The present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the rent-seeking view of resource rents as a source of conflict and the rentier state view which emphasizes the role of resource rents in promoting peace and stability, and show how one may lead to the other. The mechanism that we highlight relies on the notion that higher rents may activate more interest groups in a... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Rent Seeking; Rentier States; Resource Rents; Conflict; Patronage Employment; International Development; D74; Q34. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60687 |
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