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| Kerr, William A.. |
| The European Union is attempting to have the protection of geographic indicators strengthened in the WTO. There may be sufficient rents and other benefits available to justify this strategy in the negotiations. To achieve its rent-seeking goals, however, the European Union needs allies at the negotiations. It has been courting developing countries by touting the benefits of geographic indicators for their products. For most products originating in developing countries, the opportunities for rents will first have to be created, a resource-intensive and problematic activity. Further, even if rents can be created in the short run, the forces of competition are likely to erode them. Scarce resources might be better utilized on other development strategies that... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Developing countries; Geographic indicators; Incentives; Rent seeking; Sustainable development; WTO; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23827 |
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| Furtan, William Hartley; Guzel, A.; Karantininis, Kostas. |
| The Doha Round has been slow to achieve a reduction in the level of agricultural protection. This remains the case notwithstanding the substantial economic benefits that would arise from a more liberal agricultural trading regime. We provide one explanation for this slowness using a simple bargaining model. We demonstrate that the bargaining countries received a substantial fiscal gain from reducing government expenditures in the run-up to the Uruguay Round. This fiscal pressure was sufficient to block rent seekers who wanted farm payments to continue. Since the Uruguay Round these fiscal constraints have been reduced and the same pressure to reach a bargain and control rent-seeking behaviour is not present in the Doha Round. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Doha Round; Rent seeking; Bargaining; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7706 |
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| Coggins, Jay S.; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore; Roe, Terry L.. |
| Governments often establish economic policy in response to political pressure by interest groups. Since these groups' political activities may alter prices, economies so affected cannot be characterized by perfect competition. We develop a model of a "lobbying economy" in which consumers' choice of political activity simultaneously determines relative prices and income levels. They balance the loss in income due to lobbying payments against the potential gain in wealth from a favorable government price policy. This paper proves the existence of an equilibrium in economies of this sort. We reformulate the economy as a generalized lobbying game and prove the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium in the game. This equilibrium is then shown to be an... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Rent seeking; Generalized game; Lobbying equilibrium; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 1988 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7468 |
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| Jarvis, Lovell S.. |
| Brazil, the worlds largest coffee exporter, encouraged efforts in the 1960s to form the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), which restricted total coffee exports via country export quotas. The quotas led to significant domestic quota rents in producing countries. This paper analyzes the effects of rent seeking in Brazil. The Brazilian Institute of Coffee (IBC), which was responsible for coffee policy, was the focus of rent seeking. The paper models the policy instruments used by the IBC, shows how rent seeking affected policy, industry efficiency and the distribution of rents, explains the causes and effects of IBC reforms in the late 1980s, and draws lessons from the experience. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: South America; Brazil; International Coffee Agreement; Rent seeking; Export tax rebates; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/11952 |
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