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Cologni, Alessandro; Manera, Matteo. |
Natural resources are generally associated to negative effects on the political environment of a country. This paper explores the impact that oil revenues have on the establishment of a given political system. Based on previous literature, a political economy perspective is employed. A simple game theoretical approach in order to explain the relationships between oil revenues, political instability (conflicts) and emergence of different political systems is presented. The implementation of particular redistributive fiscal policies together with the possibility that paternalistic or “predatory" autocracies emerge are considered. Under certain circumstances, a process of full democratization is argued not to represent an optimal choice for the oil-rich... |
Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Natural Resources; Rentier States; Conflict and Endogenous Political Regimes; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C72; D74; O13; P16. |
Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123277 |
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Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Naghavi, Alireza. |
Are natural resources a source of conflict or stability? Empirical studies demonstrate that rents from natural resources, and in particular oil, are an important source of civil war. Allegedly, resource rents attract rent seekers, which destabilize society. However, there is a large literature on how so-called rentier states manage to pacify opposition groups by handing out special favors. The present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the rent-seeking view of resource rents as a source of conflict and the rentier state view which emphasizes the role of resource rents in promoting peace and stability, and show how one may lead to the other. The mechanism that we highlight relies on the notion that higher rents may activate more interest groups in a... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Rent Seeking; Rentier States; Resource Rents; Conflict; Patronage Employment; International Development; D74; Q34. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60687 |
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