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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (1) Autor Chambers, Robert G. (1) Palavra-chave Agency (1) D82 (1) Incentives (1) L23 (1) L50 (1) Multi-tasking (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Risk and Uncertainty (1) Risk complementarity (1) Risk substitutability (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2000 (1) País United States (1) Idioma Inglês (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última INCENTIVES AND STANDARDS IN AGENCY CONTRACTS AgEcon Chambers, Robert G.. This paper studies the structure of state-contingent contracts in the presence of moral hazard and multi-tasking. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of multi-tasking to lead to fixed payments instead of incentive schemes are identified. It is shown that the primary determinant of whether multi-tasking leads to higher or lower powered incentives is the role that noncontractible outputs play in helping the agent deal with the production risk associated with the observable and contractible outputs. When the noncontractible outputs are socially undesirable and risk substitutes, standards are never optimal. If the noncontractible outputs are socially desirable, standards are never optimal if the noncontractible outputs play a... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Incentives; Multi-tasking; Agency; Risk complementarity; Risk substitutability; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty; D82; L23; L50. Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28605 Registros recuperados: 1 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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