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| Shen, Zhiwei; Odening, Martin. |
| The implementation of index-based crop insurance is often impeded by the existence of systemic risk of insured losses. We assess the effectiveness of two strategies for coping with systemic risk: regional diversification and securitization with catastrophe (CAT) bonds. The analysis is conducted in an equilibrium pricing framework which allows the optimal price of the insurance and the number of traded contracts to be determined. We also explore the role of basis risk and risk aversion of market agents. The model is applied to a hypothetical area yield insurance for rice producers in northeast China. If yields in two regions are positively correlated, we find that enlarging the insured area leads to an increasing insurance premium. Unless capital market... |
| Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Crop insurance; Systemic risk; Risk pooling; Securitization; Risk and Uncertainty; Q11; Q14. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122555 |
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| Enjolras, Geoffroy; Kast, Robert. |
| High losses generated by natural catastrophes reduce the availability of insurance. Among the ways to manage risk, the subscriptions of participating and non-participating contracts respectively permit to implement the two major principles in risk allocation: the mutuality and the transfer principles. Decomposing a global risk into its idiosyncratic and systemic components, we show that: the participating contract hedges the individual losses under a variable premium and the systemic risk is covered with a non-participating contract under a fixed premium. Based on Doherty and Schlesinger (2002) and Mahul (2002) approaches, our model replaces the non-participating contract by a financial one based on an index closely correlated to the systemic risk, under a... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Catastrophe risk; Crop insurance; Optimal hedging; Securitization; Crop Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9268 |
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| Partnoy, Frank. |
| The first part of the paper describes how over time credit rating agencies ceased to play the role of information intermediaries. Rating agencies did not provide information about the risk associated with the securitized instruments, but they simply enabled structurers to create and maintain tranches of these instruments with unjustifiably high credit ratings. The second part of the paper suggests how future policy may minimize overdependence on credit ratings, by removing regulatory licences and by implementing shock-therapy mechanisms to wean investors simple rating mnemonics. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Rating Agencies; Subprime Mortgages; Securitization; Financial Economics; G24. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50472 |
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