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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Ecology and Society (1) Autor Jansen, Kees; Wageningen University, The Netherlands; Kees.Jansen@wur.nl (1) Lazarev, Valery (1) Toleubayev, Kazbek; Wageningen University, The Netherlands; Kazbek.Toleubayev@wur.nl (1) Zweynert, Joachim (1) van Huis, Arnold; Wageningen University, The Netherlands; Arnold.vanHuis@wur.nl (1) Palavra-chave Soviet Union (3) B24 (1) Bureaucracy (1) Collective action (1) D72 (1) Economic Ideas (1) Hierarchy (1) Historical Specificity (1) Implicit contract (1) Institutional Change (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Institutional change (1) J45 (1) Kazakhstan (1) Knowledge (1) Land use (1) Locust (1) N44 (1) Non-democratic regimes (1) P27 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Peer-Reviewed Synthesis (1) Ano 2007 (1) 2005 (1) 2004 (1) País United States (2) Canada (1) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Locust Control in Transition: The Loss and Reinvention of Collective Action in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan Ecology and Society Toleubayev, Kazbek; Wageningen University, The Netherlands; Kazbek.Toleubayev@wur.nl; Jansen, Kees; Wageningen University, The Netherlands; Kees.Jansen@wur.nl; van Huis, Arnold; Wageningen University, The Netherlands; Arnold.vanHuis@wur.nl. The inability to organize collective action for pest control can lead to severe problems. This paper focuses on the locust management system in Kazakhstan since the formation of the Soviet State. During the Transition Period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Plant Protection Service disintegrated. The principles of central planning were replaced with individualistic approaches with little state involvement in pest control activities or pesticide regulation. The financial and ideological reasons for dismantling the existing pest control system did not recognize the potential impact that policy-induced changes in agro-ecological conditions and control practices would have on pest development. Nature hit back at the induced institutional change that... Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Synthesis Palavras-chave: Collective action; Institutional change; Kazakhstan; Knowledge; Land use; Locust; Plant protection; Public good; Soviet Union; Transition period.. Ano: 2007 Economic Ideas and Institutional Change: Evidence from Soviet Economic Discourse 1987-1991 AgEcon Zweynert, Joachim. In recent years, institutional and evolutionary economists have become increasingly aware that ideas play an important role in economic development. In the current literature, the problem is usually elaborated upon in purely theoretical terms. In the present paper it is argued that ideas are always also shaped by historical and cultural factors. Due to this historical and cultural specificity theoretical research must be supplemented by historical case studies. The paper analyses the shift in ideas that took place in Soviet economic thought between 1987 and 1991. This case study, it is argued, may contribute to our understanding of the links between ideas and institutions. More specifically, it sheds new light on the issue of whether the evolution of... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Economic Ideas; Philosophy of Science; Institutional Change; Historical Specificity; Soviet Union; Transition; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; B24; P27. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26276 Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime AgEcon Lazarev, Valery. This paper analyzes the economic foundations of a non-democratic political regime, where the ruling bureaucracy captures rents through collective control over state property and job assignment. The model developed here yields the equilibrium in the “political labor market,” where the ruling bureaucracy buys services and political support of activists recruited from the working population. The underlying implicit contract requires that the incumbent bureaucrats retire after a certain time to allow for deferred promotion of activists into rent-paying positions. The major implications are that the stability of a non-democratic regime is consistent with high-income gap between the rulers and the rest of the population, strengthened when government pursues an... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Non-democratic regimes; Bureaucracy; Hierarchy; Political support; Promotion incentives; Implicit contract; Soviet Union; Political Economy; D72; J45; N44; P30. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28381 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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