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| Quimbert, Erwann; Jeffery, Keith; Martens, Claudia; Martin, Paul; Zhao, Zhiming. |
| After a brief reminder on general concepts used in data cataloguing activities, this chapter provides information concerning the architecture and design recommendations for the implementation of catalogue systems for the ENVRIplus community. The main objective of this catalogue is to offer a unified discovery service allowing cross-disciplinary search and access to data collections coming from Research Infrastructures (RIs). This catalogue focuses on metadata with a coarse level of granularity. It was decided to offer metadata representing different types of dataset series. Only metadata for so-called flagship products (as defined by each community) are covered by the scope of this catalogue. The data collections remain within each RI. For RIs, the aim is... |
| Tipo: Text |
Palavras-chave: Catalogue; Metadata; Data; Interoperability; Standard; ISO; OGC; Format; Schema. |
| Ano: 2020 |
URL: https://archimer.ifremer.fr/doc/00642/75455/76273.pdf |
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| Compes, Raul. |
| RESUMEN: Cuando un producto tiene atributos de confianza que son valorados por los consumidores, el mercado no funciona de forma óptima. Si existen externalidades negativas derivadas del consumo y la producción es eficiente que el gobierno establezca normas sobre las características del producto, del proceso productivo, del etiquetado o de las responsabilidades del productor. Si existen externalidades positivas o la acción colectiva es costosa lo óptimo puede ser que el gobierno fije o promueva estándares voluntarios. En el resto de los casos, es posible que una empresa transmita información creíble a los consumidores a partir de un sistema de aseguramiento privado mediante el cuál una entidad independiente certifique que cumple unos determinados... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Confidence; Standard; Certification; EUREPGAP; AENOR; Crop Production/Industries; Q16; Q18. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28754 |
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| Marette, Stephan. |
| This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers' cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cost of regulation; Information; Standard; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18458 |
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| Marette, Stephan; Beghin, John C.. |
| We analyze the effects of a domestic standard that reduces an externality associated with the consumption of the good targeted by the standard, using a model in which foreign and domestic producers compete in the domestic good market. Producers can reduce expected damage associated with the externality by incurring a cost that varies by source of origin. Despite potential protectionism, the standard is useful in correcting the consumption externality in the domestic country. Protectionism occurs when the welfare-maximizing domestic standard is higher than the international standard maximizing welfare inclusive of foreign profits. The standard is actually anti-protectionist when foreign producers are much more efficient at addressing the externality than... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Externality; Nontariff barriers; Protectionism; Safety; Standard; Tariff equivalent; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10007 |
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| Marette, Stephan. |
| This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety overinvestment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Information; Market structure; Safety; Standard; Consumer/Household Economics. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18429 |
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