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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Kinateder, Markus (1) Valsecchi, Irene (1) Palavra-chave Strategic Communication (2) C72 (1) C73 (1) Centrality (1) D81 (1) D84 (1) D85 (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Expert (1) Financial Economics (1) Imperfect Private Monitoring (1) Network (1) Opinion (1) Prisoner’s Dilemma (1) Repeated Game (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2010 (2) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Repeated Cheap-Talk Games of Common Interest between a Decision-Maker and an Expert of Unknown Statistical Bias AgEcon Valsecchi, Irene. Two agents are engaged in a joint activity that yields a common perperiod payoff at two rounds of play. The expert announces the probability that the current state of the world is low, instead of high, at each stage. Having received the report of the expert, the decision-maker takes action at every period according to his posterior beliefs. At the end of each round of play, the true current state is verifiable. The distinctive assumption of the paper is that the decision-maker makes a subjective appraisal of the expert’s reliability: he considers the expert’s true forecasts as the outcomes of an experiment of unknown statistical bias. The paper shows that the expert will have instrumental reputational concerns, related to the future estimate of the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Opinion; Expert; Strategic Communication; Financial Economics; D81; D84. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98437 The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network AgEcon Kinateder, Markus. Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truth-telling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Repeated Game; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Imperfect Private Monitoring; Network; Strategic Communication; Centrality; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; C73; D85. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96669 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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