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| Ando, Amy Whritenour. |
| This paper conducts a test of the hypothesis that interest groups compete strategically for influence with a policy-making agency. It adapts econometric methodology from the empirical industrial organization literature that was designed to work with discrete game-theoretic models, and uses data on whether or not supporting and opposing interest groups submitted comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service about each of 173 proposals to add new species to the endangered species list. The results imply that groups do respond to variations in the expected costs and benefits of a listing when deciding whether to pressure the agency. There is no support, however, for the hypothesis that the levels of pressure exerted by the groups emerge from the Nash equilibrium... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Interest groups; Strategic competition; Empirical game theory; Endangered species; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C25; C72; D72; Q28. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10732 |
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| Huettel, Silke; Margarian, Anne. |
| This paper explains regionally differentiated patterns of structural change based on a theoretical framework dealing with strategic interaction of farms on the land market. The main research question focuses on the causes of regionally persistent structures. An empirical Markov chain model is defined for the West German agricultural sector. Thereby it is possible to explain the probabilities of farm growth, decline or exit in terms of the current and former regional farm size structure. Further, the impact of variables describing the regional farm structure, thereby indicating market power of the large, the potential of high competition for land within a region and possibly high rents of the status quo in combination with sunk costs, is quantified. The... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Structural change; Strategic competition; Land market; Markov chain; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52853 |
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