SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

We analyze factors in states' decisions to switch their approaches to hazardous waste liability policy from negligence standards to policies based on strict liability. Many, but not all, states have switched in recent years. We explain differences in the timing of states' adoption of strict liability into their "mini-superfund" programs using data on states' industrial activities, environmental programs, wealth and education, and political orientation. We test implications of a theoretical model in which states adopt the liability regime (strict versus negligence-based liability) that they see as having greater net benefits. We test this model by estimating a profit equation of the presence or absence of strict liability in a state hazardous waste cleanup...

Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases

Palavras-chave: Strict liability; Toxic spills; Liability policy; Hazardous materials; Environmental Economics and Policy; D78; H73; I18.

Ano: 1997

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10680

Proponents of environmental policies based on liability assert that strict liability imposed on polluters induces firms to handle hazardous wastes properly. We run regressions relating unintended pollution releases to strict liability imposed on polluters, exploiting variation across states and over time in the liability provisions of state mini-Superfund laws. Strict liability reduces the frequency and severity of pollution releases, provided it is modeled endogenously with the latter. Its effects vary with firm size. Partially sheltered from liability, small firms may have specialized in riskier production processes, but their number has not necessarily grown in response to the states' liability policy.

Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases

Palavras-chave: Strict liability; Negligence; Hazardous waste; State environmental policy; Endogenous policy adoption; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; D72; K13.

Ano: 2001

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10518

Proponents of environmental policies based on liability assert that strict liability imposed on the polluter will induce firms to handle hazardous wastes properly and to avoid disposing them into the environment. Economic theory and a few well-publicized cases, however, suggest that a number of factors may dilute the incentives posed by strict liability. In this paper, we run regressions relating unintended releases of pollution into the environment (aggregated at the state level, and followed over nine years from 1987 to 1995) to the imposition of strict liability on the polluter, exploiting variation across states in the liability provisions of their mini-Superfund laws, and in the years these were adopted. We experiment with instrumental variable...

Strict Liability as a Deterrent in Toxic Waste Management: Empirical Evidence from Accident and Spill Data

Palavras-chave: Strict liability; Toxic spills; Policy endogeneity; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; C33; K32.

Ano: 1999

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10450

This paper explores the issue of whether strict liability imposed on polluters has served to reduce uncontrolled releases of toxics into the environment. Strict liability should create additional incentives for firms to handle hazardous substances more carefully, thus reducing the future likelihood of uncontrolled releases of toxics. However, the size of these incentives may vary according to the size of a firm's assets, since asset size is the ultimate limit on a firm's liability. We are therefore interested to see whether imposing strict liability for the cost of remediation at hazardous waste sites has encouraged firms to handle toxic materials more carefully and has uniformly reduced the incidence of toxic spills, or whether the effect is dependent on...